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A Great Invisible Crashing: The Rise 
and Fall of Patent Eligibility Through 
Mayo v. Prometheus 
N. Scott Pierce 
 
Despite its apparent simplicity, satisfaction of the statutory 
threshold for patent eligibility in the United States has become 
increasingly uncertain and, recently, almost impossible to predict 
in some fields.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
existence of the many lower-court tests for patent eligibility that 
have evolved, and has even encouraged the development of 
additional tests.  Behind all of these tests, however, is a 
fundamental premise dating back to English common law that 
limits patentable subject matter to the physical application of a 
naturally-occurring principle.  In Mayo v. Prometheus, the 
Supreme Court effectively supplanted all previous criteria for 
patent eligibility with a requirement that any application of the 
laws of nature, naturally-occurring physical phenomena or 
abstract ideas be “inventive,” thereby hopelessly confusing 
satisfaction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 with requirements for patentability 
under other sections of the statute.  Mayo, in short, annihilates the 
last vestiges of any rational attempt to distinguish patent eligibility 
from patentability.  By failing to separately define “inventive” 
beyond its meaning under those other portions of the statute, the 
Court severely undermines the predictability upon which the 
economic benefits of patent law depends. 
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Suffolk University Law School.  He can be reached at (978) 341-0036 and at 
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[I]t will be a spectacle: the fall of a crystal palace.  
But coming down in total blackout, without one 
glint of light, only great invisible crashing. 
—Thomas Pynchon1 
INTRODUCTION 
Title 35 of the United States Code provides the standard for 
patent eligibility in section 101, providing that “[w]hoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”2  Despite its apparent simplicity, proper 
application of this statutory provision requires an understanding of 
the history of patent eligibility, beginning with its roots in England. 
“Letters of protection” began in England as a way to encourage 
foreign craftsmen to immigrate to England and bring their skills 
with them.3  A patent could be obtained under English “patent 
custom” for technology that was new to the realm—even if 
previously known elsewhere—so long as the imported technology 
on which it was based did not deleteriously affect employment.4  
Further, the patentee was obligated to practice the invention upon 
pain of revocation of the patent.5 
As the scope of protection expanded beyond imported 
manufactures and the threat of competition with existing 
technology became more apparent, the requirement to practice an 
invention in exchange for an exclusive right was displaced by a 
requirement to put the public in possession of the invention.6  Early 
 
 1 THOMAS PYNCHON, GRAVITY’S RAINBOW 1(Penguin Press 2012) (1973). 
 2 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 3 CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH 
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, 10 (1988). 
 4 Id. at 12–13. 
 5 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: 
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 857 (1994). 
 6 See Liardet v. Johnson, (1788) 1 Web. P.C. 53 (K.B.); 1 Carp. 35 (“The meaning of 
the specification is, that others may be taught to do the thing for which the patent is 
granted; and if the specification is false, the patent is void, for after the term the public 
ought to have the benefit of the discovery.”); see also H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM 
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fears that patent protection might be overly broad or granted too 
readily and for slight improvements only reinforced the country’s 
need for an adequate description of the invention and the necessity 
of having a means by which to “recognize innovations.”7  By the 
late eighteenth century, at about the time the first patent acts in the 
United States were being drafted and enacted, both products 
themselves and the processes for their manufacture and use were 
becoming viewed in England as applications of naturally-occurring 
principles.8  American courts generally followed suit, as will be 
seen.9 
Over the last two hundred years, technological changes have 
forced courts to struggle not only with patentable distinction, but 
also with the scope of patent eligibility.  In doing so, a wide variety 
of tests have been developed—particularly over the last one 
hundred years—that have tended to obscure the original premise 
that patent eligibility must flow from the physical application of a 
naturally-occurring principle.  Even in the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision regarding the scope of patentable subject matter, Bilski v. 
Kappos,10 there is little to guide the public in distinguishing 
between “an application of a law of nature or mathematical 
formula to a known structure or process [that] may well be 
deserving of patent protection”11 and limitation of “an abstract idea 
to one field of use or adding token post-solution components [that] 
did not make the concept patentable,”12 both of which were 
invoked by the Court in holding that a claimed method of hedging 
risk “would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and would 
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”13  Federal 
 
AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1852, 75 (1984) 
(quoting E. Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and 
Present, 13 L. Q. Rev. 313, 317–318 (1897)) (“Lord Mansfield concluded that ‘the 
doctrine of the instruction of the public by means of the personal effects and supervision 
of the grantee was definitely and finally laid aside [in Liardet v. Johnson] in favor of the 
novel theory that this function belongs to the patent specification.’”). 
 7 See MACLEOD, supra note 3 at 51–55. 
 8 See, e.g., Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.); 8 T.R. 95. 
 9 See infra Part I.B. 
 10 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 11 Id. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)). 
 12 Id. at 3231. 
 13 Id. 
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Circuit cases that have issued since Bilski and the Supreme Court’s 
apparent encouragement to lower courts to continue to develop 
new tests of patent eligibility reflect a continuing potential for 
confusion. 
The origin of all of the tests that have been developed to date 
can be traced to the idea of the physical application of a naturally-
occurring principle.  However, links between these tests and this 
underlying premise have become sporadic and circumstantial.  For 
example, a growing tendency among courts to confuse patent 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with patentability under other 
sections of the statute—such as novelty,14 nonobviousness15 and 
even enablement16—has led to calls to forego application of tests 
for patent eligibility except as a last resort.17  The recent decision 
by the Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.18 has rendered superfluous all tests 
developed by the lower courts for determining patent eligibility 
under section 101 by grounding patent eligibility in “inventive 
application” and “inventive concept.”19  As applied by the Court in 
Mayo, statutory eligibility is a function of the “creative value of the 
 
 14 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 15 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
 16 See 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 17 See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
In the case before us, for all these reasons the proper course of action 
is the one that the trial court and the panel majority has followed: 
decide the case on the question of compliance with §§ 102 and 103 as 
Congress has instructed, and decline the dissent’s invitation to put the 
parties and this court in the swamp that is § 101 jurisprudence. 
Id. at 1262; see also Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-
Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 
(2010). 
We take a different approach; rather than try to cut through the 
complexity of Bilski, or predict how it will be applied, we talk about 
how to avoid it. . . . We propose that the § 101 issue of Bilski be 
considered only when doing so is absolutely necessary to determine 
the validity of a claim or claims in a patent. 
Id.at 1673. 
 18 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 19 See id. at 1299.   
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discovery”20 that is intended to somehow “balance . . . 
considerations [that] may differ from one field to another.”21 
The idea that the physical application of a naturally-occurring 
principle is the underlying criterion for patent eligibility is a 
linchpin of patent law; failure to abide by it will result in 
uncertainty as to whether newly developed technologies will meet 
the threshold requirement of patent eligibility as a “process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.”22  Moreover, abandonment of the 
application-of-principle standard will dangerously expand the 
potential scope of exclusionary rights into areas that may hinder 
economic growth. 
Part I of this Article charts the rise of physical application of 
naturally-occurring principle as a threshold for patent eligibility, 
beginning with the first English patents, and following the 
development of this doctrine in the United States under the early 
Patent Acts.  In Part II, the fall of physical application of naturally-
occurring principle as a threshold is charted through to the 
Supreme Court decision of Bilski v. Kappos and its immediate 
aftermath.  Part III argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Mayo v. Prometheus completes the fall, predicating an ensuing 
unpredictability in statutory eligibility that will undermine the 
patent system as we know it and may, ultimately, lead to 
diminished reliance on patents as a means for advancement of 
economic development. 
I. THE RISE OF APPLICATION OF NATURALLY-OCCURRING 
PRINCIPLE AS A THRESHOLD FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
A. Early Patent Protection in England 
In the fourteenth century, during the reign of Edward III, non-
exclusive “letters of protection” were granted to foreign craftsmen 
for the purpose of “encouraging them to settle in England and to 
 
 20 Id. at 1303. 
 21 Id. at 1305. 
 22 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  
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transmit their skills to native apprentices.”23  Later, during the 
middle of the sixteenth century, exclusive protection was 
introduced for the same purpose.24  However, an exclusive right 
would be granted only if it would not harm existing industries.25  
Further, “inventions” had to be practiced—under penalty of 
revocation.26  These policies eventually eroded, so that by the end 
of the sixteenth century monopolies were often granted on the 
basis of influence, and without reference to importation.27  As a 
result of dissatisfaction with “abuse of the royal prerogative,” 
many such patents were revoked in 1601 and, again, under King 
James I in 1621, culminating in the Statute of Monopolies in 
1624.28 
The Statute of Monopolies declared void most monopolies 
granted by royal prerogative.29  Exempted from the statute were 
any letters patent and grants of privilege for the 
term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be 
made, of the sole working or making of any manner 
of new manufactures within this realm, to the true 
and first inventor and inventors of such 
manufactures, which others at the time of making 
such letters patent and grants shall not use.30 
Sir Edward Coke, who had introduced the predecessor to the 
bill of 1624 in 1621, and participated in consideration of the bill of 
1624, understood the term “inventor” to embrace importers of 
“manufactures”31 and considered novelty to be only a function of 
whether the subject matter was actually being used in England at 
 
 23 MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 10. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id.at 13 (“Employment was sacrosanct, and the inventor who threatened it was 
denied official recognition and protection by patent.”). 
 26 See id.at 12. 
 27 See id.at 14. 
 28 See id.at 14–15. 
 29 See Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 18 (“[Coke] followed Elizabethan practice in 
understanding ‘inventor’ to include the importers of manufactures and technical 
devices.”). 
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the time a patent was applied for.32  Absolute novelty was not 
material.  Both of these interpretations were consistent with earlier 
attempts to promote the immigration of skilled artisans in order to 
introduce new technology to England.33 
Although the question of what, in fact, constituted a 
manufacture was not one that Coke considered to be difficult,34 nor 
one that appears to be squarely addressed until the case of Boulton 
v. Bull in 1795,35 a number of cases appeared to shift the eligibility 
and scope of protection afforded by patent grant.  For example, as 
described by MacLeod, a patent sought by Benjamin Lund and 
Francis Hawksbee in 1727 was challenged by the Company of 
Copper Miners of England on the basis that each refinery “goes 
upon the same principles in refining, yet scarce any two exactly 
pursue the same method and form in practice.”36  The patent was 
granted because the petitioners, Lund and Hawksbee, only applied 
for a patent for making brass “in a particular furnace, which had 
never been used before, without pots.”37 
A similar result occurred in Morris v. Bramsom in 1776,38 in 
which the patent that issued was upheld following an enquiry by 
the jury to the effect that, if the only objection to the patent were 
on the basis of it being an addition to an old machine, “that 
objection would go to repeal almost every patent that was ever 
granted.”39  Following Morris, it was generally considered that a 
patent of addition can be good but “it must be for the addition only, 
and not for the old machine too.”40  Another case, Liardet v. 
Johnson,41 required that a specification enable one skilled in the 
 
 32 See id. (“Similarly, it was not a question of whether the manufacture or device 
concerned had ever been used in England before, but whether it was in use at the time the 
patent was applied for.”). 
 33 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 34 See id. (“‘[I]t must be granted to the first and true inventor,’ and . . . ‘it must be of 
such manufacture, which any other at the making of such letters patent did not use.’  
Coke did not anticipate any difficulties in the interpretation of these clauses.”). 
 35 Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 463. 
 36 See MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 51. 
 37 Id. at 51–52. 
 38 Morris v. Bramsom, (1776) 1 Carp. 30 (K.B.). 
 39 Id. (quoting Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 664). 
 40 Id. (quoting Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 664). 
 41 Liardet v. Johnson, (1788) 1 Web. P.C. 53 (K.B.); 1 Carp. 35.   
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relevant art or trade to practice the invention without undue 
experimentation and consequently, as stated by MacLeod, “[f]or 
the first time, the recognized quid pro quo for the award of a patent 
was the disclosure of the invention.”42   
We can see from these cases the seeds of modern patent law.  
Specifically, novelty became a substitute for importation and lack 
of interference with an existing industry, and the enabling role of 
the description of a patented invention replaced the earlier 
requirement to work the invention as the price for obtaining 
exclusionary rights.  The question remained, however, of what 
constituted the scope of a “manufacture” under section 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies.  The answer to that question would come 
toward the end of the eighteenth century in the context of a 
standard that would allow both novelty in application of principle 
and adequacy of specification to replace the previous requirements 
of importation and practice of the invention. 
In 1769, James Watt obtained a patent directed to an 
improvement on a steam engine.  Watt followed the advice of his 
friend, William Small, to not include in his patent specification 
“drawings nor descriptions of any particular machinery, but [to] 
specify in the clearest manner that you have discovered some 
principles.”43  Watt’s invention was directed to an improvement of 
the Newcomen steam or “fire” engine.44  The employment of a 
separate condenser to draw steam made it no longer necessary to 
 
 42 MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 49; see also Turner v. Winter, (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 
(K.B.) 1276; 1 T. R. 602 (“[I]t is sufficient if persons of skill can understand the process 
by means of the specification,” and that “a man of science may be able to produce the 
thing intended without the necessity of trying experiments.”); DUTTON, supra note 6, at 
75. 
[I]n King v. Arkwright (1785), [Buller, J.] held . . . “the end and 
meaning of the specification is to teach the public after the term for 
which the patent is granted what the art is, and it must put the public 
in possession of the secret in as ample and beneficial way as the 
patentee himself uses it.” 
Id. 
 43 JENNY UGLOW, THE LUNAR MEN 243 (2002). 
 44 See id. at 101. 
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condense vapor in the cylinder containing the piston, thereby 
significantly improving the engine’s efficiency.45 
Watt’s patent was tested in Boulton v. Bull, which was heard in 
the Court of Common Pleas in 1795.46  The defendants challenged 
the validity of the patent by arguing that a patent cannot consist 
merely of principles, but must, rather, be “embodied and reduced 
into practice.”47  Otherwise, “like the sentiments of an author, 
while in his own mind . . . they are alike the property of him, or of 
another.”48  The patent was invalid, according to the defendants, 
because the invention was an improvement and because the 
specification did not “correspond with it,” since the patent was for 
“mere principles, which . . . cannot be the subject of a patent.”49 
The plaintiffs countered that the patent was directed to “a new 
invented method of lessening the consumption of steam and fuel in 
fire engines,” and that the specification “states both the principle of 
the invention, and also the mode in which it is to operate.”50  The 
“difference in the terms used in the patent and the specification,” 
namely the “method” and “principle of the invention,” as stated by 
the plaintiffs, “arises from the nature of the subject, but the real 
meaning of them is the same.”51  In essence, then, the method was 
the application of principle of the invention.  The plaintiffs argued 
that the patent directed to the method should be upheld, despite the 
fact that a right is given to the whole machine by employment of 
the method: 
 
 45 See id.; see also  WILLIAM ROSEN, THE MOST POWERFUL IDEA IN THE WORLD 104–06 
(2010). 
 46 The original patent was set to expire in 1783, but, by an Act of Parliament, the Fire-
Engine Act of 1775, the patent was extended for twenty-five years. See id. at 162–63. 
 47 Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. at 656.   
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 658.  As stated by the defendants: 
Upon the whole therefore of the case, it appears either that the patent 
is for an entire formed machine, when it ought to have been for an 
improvement only, and in which case the specification does not 
correspond with it, or it is for mere principles, which, according to 
the stat. 21 Jac. 1 c. 3, cannot be the subject of a patent.  
Id. 
 50 Id.   
 51 Id.   
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Where an improvement is made upon a machine 
already known, the patent ought not to be the 
machine itself, but for the method of improving it . . 
. . [I]f from the nature of the thing a patent for the 
new method or improvement only should have the 
effect of giving a right to the whole machine, that is 
not of itself a ground on which the patent can be set 
aside.52 
Two of the four judges held the subject matter to be within the 
Statute of Monopolies and the specification to sufficiently describe 
the invention, despite the lack of description of any particular 
machinery for carrying it out.53 
Four years after Boulton v. Bull, however, in Hornblower v. 
Boulton the King’s Bench did not have any difficulty in 
unanimously finding the improvement represented by that same 
patent to be eligible subject matter.54  The questions previously 
addressed by the Court of Common Pleas were reflected in the 
defendants’ four arguments on appeal, namely, first, that section 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies provides for patentability of “a 
formed machine;” second, that Watt’s improvement “could not be 
considered as a patent for such a machine;” third, that “the 
specification did not contain sufficient description of a machine;” 
and fourth, that Watt had taken a patent “for the whole, when it 
ought to have been for an addition only.”55  The arguments were 
addressed as two questions: whether Watt’s improvement was a 
patent for mere principles and not for a new manufacture, and, if a 
manufacture, whether the specification provided an adequate 
description.56 
The court found in Watt’s favor.57  Lord Chief Justice Kenyon 
found that answer to be self-evident.58  Justice Ashhurst agreed, 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. at 477–500. 
 54 Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.); 8 T.R. 95. 
 55 Id. at 1287. 
 56 See id. at 1288. 
 57 See id. at 1288–92. 
 58 Id. at 1288 (“[I]t evidently appears that the patentee claims a monopoly for an 
engine or machine, composed of material parts, which are to produce the effect 
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seeming to imply that adequate description of the nature of the 
invention was itself sufficient to secure the patent.59  Justice Grose 
showed how a sufficiently detailed specification might, by 
enabling others to work the invention, replace the requirement that 
the patentee himself work the invention.60  Likewise, Judge 
Lawrence relied on the specification to resolve the apparent 
discrepancy between principles and manufacture: 
In order to see what the invention was, it is 
necessary to refer to the specification; that states 
what the invention is, and that the method consists 
in certain principles, as they are called, which are 
described in the specification. . . . Engine and 
method mean the same thing, and may be the 
subject of a patent.  “Method,” properly speaking, is 
only placing several things and performing several 
operations in the most convenient order; but it may 
signify a contrivance or device; so may an engine, 
and there I think it may answer the word “method.”  
So “principle” may mean a mere elementary truth, 
but it may also mean constituent parts; and in effect 
the specification is this: “The contrivance by which 
I lessen the consumption of steam consists in the 
following principles, that is, constituent or 
elementary parts . . . . That is the description of the 
thing put into different language. 
. . . If this be so, it only remains to be considered, 
whether or not, for the improvement of fire engines, 
Watt has, with sufficient accuracy, stated a definite 
alteration or addition which may be made in all fire 
 
described; and that the mode of producing this is so described as to enable mechanics to 
produce it.”). 
 59 Id. (“[T]he inventor had by his specification particularly described the nature of his 
invention, and the manner in which it was to be performed; and having thus complied 
with the terms of his patent, I think he is, in point of law as well as justice, entitled to the 
benefit which the patent and the Act of Parliament intended to confer on him.”)  
 60 Id. at 1290 (“[T]he patent is not merely for principles, nor does the specification 
describe principles only.  The patent states the principles on which the inventor proceeds, 
and shows in his specification the manufacture by means of which those principles are to 
take effect.”). 
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engines, in such a way as to enable a workman to 
execute it?  And it seems to me that he has.61 
Regarding whether or not a patent could be granted for an 
addition to previously known matter, Justice Grose made short 
work of the contention that it could not: 
If indeed a patent could not be granted for an 
addition, it would be depriving the public of one of 
the best benefits of the Statute of James.  Lord 
Coke’s opinion therefore seems to have been 
formed without due consideration; and modern 
experience shows that it is not well founded. . . . 
[T]he engines secured to the patentee are such as 
are improved in the manner stated in the 
specification, and not the original fire engines. . . .62 
Therefore, absolute novelty in application of principle on the 
one hand, and adequacy of specification on the other operated 
together in Hornblower v. Boulton to define an invention under the 
Statute of Monopolies, thereby providing alternatives to the 
previous requirements of importation and practice of the invention. 
B.  The Constitution and the First Patent Acts in the United States 
In the United States, a similar progression of events was 
unfolding, albeit in microcosm.  States had been granting 
exclusionary rights to inventors since before implementation of the 
Constitution in 1789.63  Just as in England, protection originally 
had been granted to the first to import new technology, eventually 
shifting to “patents of invention.”64  Also as in England, the quid 
pro quo of such protection often included a requirement to fully 
describe and practice the invention.65 
 
 61 Id. at 1291–92. 
 62 Id. at 1290–91. 
 63 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: 
Antecedents (5, Part II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665, 668 & n.120 (1996). 
 64 See id. at 668.  
 65 Id. at 670.  Walterscheid quotes a patent granted by New York in 1780 to Henry 
Guest: 
Provided nevertheless that the grant hereby made shall not take effect 
until the said Henry Guest shall have filed in the secretary’s office in 
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known as “the intellectual 
property clause,” of the United States Constitution, authorizes 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”66  The clause 
generally is understood to include two broad component parts.  As 
articulated by the Judiciary Committee reports of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate prepared during enactment of the 
Patent Act of 1952, a “first provision is to promote the progress of 
science by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive right 
to their writings, the word ‘science’ in this connection having the 
meaning of knowledge in general.”67  A second provision “is that 
Congress has the power to promote the progress of useful arts by 
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their 
discoveries.”68  There has been much confusion and debate over 
the years about construction of the intellectual property clause, 
both as to whether “Progress of Science and useful Arts” are 
jointly objects for securing exclusive rights to both authors and 
inventors, and with respect to the meaning of the term “science.”69  
Walterscheid states that “[t]he fact that scientific discoveries 
frequently are patentable only adds to the confusion.  Indeed, it 
may be for this reason that some commentators appear to view 
these terms as interchangeable in their discussions of the patent 
provision.”70  Walterscheid states that the term “science” generally 
meant “knowledge” or “learning,”71 while the phrase “useful arts” 
meant “basically helpful or valuable trades.”72 
 
this State, a writing containing the names and description of the 
materials aforesaid, and the method and process of making such 
blubber and oyl, or a substitute of blubber and oyl; nor until the said 
Henry Guest shall have a manufactory erected for the purpose, and 
shall have made such blubber and oyl, of the materials aforesaid, 
within this State. 
Id. 
 66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 67 H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952). 
 68 H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952). 
 69 See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 120–21 (2002). 
 70 Id. at 121. 
 71 See id. at 125. 
 72 See id. at 126. 
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It would appear, however, that there is at least some overlap in 
the meanings of the terms “science” and “useful arts” as those 
terms were understood at the time the Constitution was drafted.  
Mokyr, for example, points out that the concept of “usefulness” 
that developed during eighteenth century Britain “involved both 
practical uses (that is, technology) and a moral and intellectual 
improvement of humanity so that people would be taught more 
virtuous lives.”73  According to Mokyr, the notion of “‘useful arts,’ 
what we call today science and technology,”74 arose in conjunction 
with recognition of mutual reinforcement of useful knowledge and 
economic performance,75 wherein under an “Enlightenment 
view . . . it was the role of the state to enhance prosperity and 
growth and to encourage the formation and dissemination of useful 
knowledge.”76  Advancement of the “useful arts,” in effect, 
embodied the ideas of Francis Bacon, as stated by Mokyr, “to 
attain material progress through technological progress [by] 
application of inductive and experimental method to investigate 
nature, the creation of a universal natural history, and 
reorganization of science as a human activity.”77  The three 
components of this “Baconian program” were “research into 
natural phenomenon,” a research agenda “directed to areas where 
there was a high chance of solving practical problems—in 
medicine, manufacturing, navigation, and so on,” and 
minimization of “access costs to this knowledge . . . not only by 
dissemination but also by organizing and classifying what was 
known.”78  The distinction, therefore, between “science” and 
“useful arts” as those terms were employed in the Constitution, 
appears to be a distinction between knowledge—that is, knowledge 
based on natural phenomena—and its application.  In other words, 
and as again expressed by Mokyr, it was the Enlightenment “idea 
of useful knowledge which gave people power over nature and not 
 
 73 JOEL MOKYR, THE ENLIGHTENED ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN 
1700–1850, 35 (2009). 
 74 Id. at 40. 
 75 Id. at 35. 
 76 Id. at 26. 
 77 Id. at 41. 
 78 Id. at 40. 
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(just) over other people.  It is this kind of power that . . . is at the 
very core of what increasingly mattered in this period.”79 
As we have seen, during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries new application of principle became a basis for 
patentable distinction as a substitute for bare novelty.80  Further, 
just as protection under section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies was 
limited to manufactures, and later to methods associated with 
manufactures, the type of principle—the new application of which 
would qualify for patent protection under the constitutional 
category of “useful arts”—generally was limited to that of a 
naturally-occurring power over nature, as opposed to knowledge 
which gave people power “(just) over other people.”  The phrase 
“useful arts,” or “useful knowledge,” nevertheless, is very broad.  
Mokyr, for example, specifically applies the phrase “useful 
knowledge,” as that concept was understood, to applications of 
formal mathematics and demographic statistics to develop actuarial 
techniques supporting advancements in the insurance industry in 
the eighteenth century.81 
Moreover, if, as Walterscheid argues, the term “science,” as 
that term was employed at the time the Constitution was drafted, is 
to be interpreted broadly as “knowledge,” and if the phrases 
“useful arts” and “useful knowledge” were considered equivalent 
during the same period, as referenced by Mokyr, then “knowledge” 
and “useful knowledge” appear to properly belong within the same 
clause, which not only includes securing to authors an exclusive 
right to their writings and to inventors an exclusive right to their 
discoveries, but also incorporates James Madison’s proposal, “to 
encourage by proper premiums and provisions the advancement of 
 
 79 Id. at 35. 
 80 See supra text accompanying notes 23–62. 
 81 See MOKYR, supra note 73, at 230.   
The idea that useful knowledge of any kind should be brought to bear 
on the production of goods and services and that it should therefore 
be applied to the insurance industry is typical of the age of 
Enlightenment.  Formal mathematics and demographics statistics 
were important components of the epistemic base that supported the 
correct actuarial techniques in this industry. 
Id. 
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useful knowledge and discoveries.”82  In other words, the clause is 
open-ended, not only in the types of exclusive rights that can be 
granted by Congress, but also in the types of knowledge beyond 
“writings,” and the types of useful knowledge beyond 
“discoveries,” that can be rewarded.  Under this view, the types of 
“useful knowledge” and “discoveries” potentially subject to 
exclusionary rights, therefore, is broad, excluding, as discussed 
above, only purely human interactions that only leverage power 
over others.83 
Madison referred to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known 
as “the intellectual property” clause, in the Federalist papers: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be 
questioned.  The copyright of authors has been 
 
 82 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 69, at 116–17. 
What is common to the balanced composition of the clause are the 
terms “promote,” “progress,” “securing,” and “limited times.”  The 
usual interpretation is that Congress is given two separate powers 
involving the common use of these terms.  In this view, it is given 
power (1) “to promote the progress of science . . . by securing for 
limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . writings,” 
and (2) “to promote the progress of . . . useful arts by securing for 
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their . . . 
discoveries.” 
 . . . A careful comparison of the actual language of the clause 
with the proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney suggests that 
the conventional wisdom is wrong, and that the clause is actually a 
consolidation and incorporation of three separate and distinct 
proposals presented by these gentlemen. . . . What is not generally 
recognized is that the clause incorporates a third proposal, namely, 
that by Madison to encourage by proper premiums and provisions the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries. 
Id. 
 83 See supra text accompanying note 79.  Interestingly, the Royal Society, which was 
founded in 1660 on the principles espoused by Francis Bacon, had as its stated purpose: 
“To improve the knowledge of natural things, and all useful Arts, Manufacturers, 
Mechanik practices, Engines and Inventions by Experiments (not meddling with Divinity, 
Metaphysics, Moralls, Politiks, Grammar, Rhetoric or Logick).” HENRY GEORGE LYONS, 
THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 1660–1940: A HISTORY OF ITS ADMINISTRATION UNDER ITS 
CHARTERS 41 (1944).  “Grammar” and “Rhetoric” were the seventeenth century 
equivalents of social science, which broadly embraces disciplines associated with society 
and human behavior, including, for example, economics, information science, 
management science, marketing and political economy. See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM 
ADAMSON, PIONEERS OF MODERN EDUCATION 1600–1700, 65 (1921). 
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solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of 
the common law.  The right to useful inventions 
seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.  
The public good fully coincides in both cases with 
the claims of individuals.  The States cannot make 
effectual provision for either of the cases, and most 
of them have anticipated the decision on this point, 
by laws passed at the instance of Congress.84 
Although the intellectual property clause makes reference only 
to “the exclusive right” to be secured by the authority of Congress, 
Madison’s reference to “the public good” coinciding with the 
claims of individuals can only be understood as the benefit to the 
public by introduction of writings and useful inventions and 
ultimate ownership by the public of them by their disclosure.  
Grant of a limited period of exclusivity to promote generation and 
introduction of knowledge and its application is consistent with 
Mokyr’s view of the “Baconian program” in Great Britain: 
The Baconian program was built on two 
unshakeable axioms: that the expansion of useful 
knowledge would solve social and economic 
problems, and that the dissemination of existing 
knowledge to more and more people would lead to 
substantial efficiency gains.  It was also understood 
how this was to be brought about.  On its own, 
artisanal knowledge would be insufficient.  Without 
the work of natural philosophers, who would infuse 
it with new knowledge and connect different 
industries, an artisanal economy would eventually 
revert to a technologically stationary state.85 
Mokyr, instead of partitioning knowledge and its application, 
as might be suggested by separately addressing advancement of 
“knowledge” and “useful knowledge,” emphasizes their 
“complementarity,” at least as they contributed to technological 
progress in Britain during this period: 
 
 84 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 85 MOKYR, supra note 73, at 61. 
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Rather than posing the question of whether it was 
theorists or practical people who brought about 
technological progress, we need to see the 
fundamental complementarity between them.  It 
was precisely their presence together and their 
ability to interact and produce something larger that 
has the power to explain Britain’s technological 
successes.86 
This does not mean that the framers of the United States 
Constitution intended that a period of exclusivity was to be granted 
to pure acquisition of knowledge; the clear language of the clause 
references “Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”87  Here, the parallelism of 
the clause is spelled out; authors are to be granted exclusive rights 
for their writings, and inventors for their discoveries.  However, 
the “Progress of Science and useful Arts” arguably was to be 
advanced by granting exclusive rights in both “Writings and 
Discoveries.” With respect to inventors, then, the question 
becomes who qualifies as an “inventor” and what is a “discovery.” 
Shortly after the Constitution came into effect on March 4, 
1789, a bill known as “H.R. 10” was introduced to “promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”88  The bill provided for 
grant of letters patent to any person who has “invented or 
discovered any [new] art, manufacture, engine, machine, invention 
or device, or any improvement upon, or in some art, manufacture, 
engine, machine, invention or device, not before known or used.”89  
There was no geographical limit to the phrase “not before known 
or used,” and Walterscheid states that, consistent with Liardet v. 
Johnson,90 where publication  and “prior working” consequently 
became recognized as bars to patentability, “[t]he intent seems to 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 88 See e.g., EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: 
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787–1836, 87 (1998).  
 89 Id. at 92. 
 90 Liardet v. Johnson, (1788) 1 Web. P.C. 53 (K.B.); 1 Carp. 35. 
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have been merely to have novelty treated the same in the United 
States as it was in Great Britain.”91 
This is not to say, however, that patents of importation were to 
be excluded.  To the contrary, the original section six of H.R. 41, 
the bill that, with amendment, would become the Patent Act of 
1790, specifically provided for such protection.92  However, 
requirements to provide an enabling disclosure and to recognize 
publication removed the conventional geographic barriers 
associated with working the invention and prior knowledge.93  
Further, written description—both of the invention and as prior 
knowledge—inherently raised the question of the scope of 
protection to be afforded by exclusive rights, in that 
representations of the invention or the art could be much broader 
than what was actually practiced.  Inventors logically would be 
interested in obtaining protection that was as broad as possible 
despite the fact that, in general, all aspects of any invention could 
separately be found in the prior art.  Yet, protection could not be so 
broad as to hurt trade, the prohibition against which had been the 
central directive underlying grant of exclusive rights to promote 
importation since the early sixteenth century.94 
The word “principle,” in association with patentable subject 
matter, came into common use in the United States very early.  
Even prior to the Patent Act of 1790, a petition was filed by one 
John Churchman on April 15, 1789 for an exclusive right to a 
method for determining longitude.95  The House Committee 
reported a petition stating that Churchman had “applied his 
 
 91 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 94. 
 92 Section six, as originally drafted, would be replaced before passage of the bill, but 
originally stated: 
And it is hereby further enacted, that any person, who shall after the 
passing of this act, first import into the United States from any 
foreign country, any art, machine, engine, device or invention, or any 
improvement thereon, not before used or known in said states, such 
person, his executors, administrators and assigns, shall have the full 
benefit of this act, as if he were the original inventor or improver 
within said States. 
H.R. 41, 1st Cong. (1790), quoted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 452. 
 93 See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.   
 94 See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
 95 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 82.   
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principles to many instances in Cook’s voyages,” and that “he is 
also engaged in constructing tables for determining the longitude at 
sea upon magnetic principles.”96  The committee was “of opinion 
that such efforts deserve encouragement, and that a law should 
pass to secure to Mr. Churchman, for a term of years, the exclusive 
pecuniary emolument to be derived from the publication of these 
several inventions.”97 
John Fitch also presented a petition for exclusive rights, on 
May 13, 1789, in view of his being “the original discoverer of the 
principle of applying the power of steam to the purposes of 
navigation.”98  The scope of protection would be to “preclude 
subsequent improves upon his principle from participating therein 
until the expiration of the term of his exclusive grants.”99  Fitch 
also distinguished between the “principle” of his invention and the 
“modes” of its application: as pointed out by Walterscheid, Fitch 
stated that his invention “consists in applying the force of Steam, 
and not in which of these modes it is applied.”100 
Similarly, James Rumsey commented in a letter to Jefferson on 
June 6, 1789: 
Such machines as are already in use (and their 
principles not under any restrictions by patents) 
then Every person Improving on Such machines 
ought to have a grant for Such improvement and no 
more, but Where the principle itself is new I humbly 
Conceive that it ought to be Secured to the inventor 
for a Limited time . . . .101 
Walterscheid observes that “Rumsey agreed with Fitch that a 
person who invents a new ‘principle’ should have a broad 
dominant patent.”102 
 
 96 Id. at 83. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 85. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 106. 
 102 Id. 
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H.R. 10 specified that, in the event of a contest between 
inventors, a jury would determine priority of invention if “the 
inventions or discoveries aforesaid, claimed by two or more 
parties, shall appear to be substantially the same, both in principle 
and execution.”103  Further, what is believed to be a typescript of 
the bill, discovered in 1955, states at section 5 that a contest over 
priority of invention shall be determined by justices who will 
“adjudge” whether they are the same, “both in principle and 
execution.”104 
H.R. 10 ultimately was replaced by H.R. 41.  However, another 
bill, H.R. 44, modeled on H.R. 10105 and directed to an invention to 
prevent counterfeiting, was considered separately by a committee 
that recommended H.R. 44 become law, citing the Act of British 
Parliament granting Bolton and Watt’s patent.  The “Principle” of 
the invention at issue in the bill was of central concern: 
It was on this Ground that the British Parliament 
passed an Act in 1786 securing to Bolton & Watt a 
new Invention to condense Steam for working 
Steam Engines, the Principle of which was to draw 
the Steam out of the Cylinder by an exhausted 
Receiver which could be done in so many different 
Forms that had they taken a Patent for their Form, 
others might be used not described in their 
Specification and they would be robbed of the 
Principle of their Invention, which was therefore 
granted by a Special Act of Parliament.106 
However, the Patent Act of 1790 as enacted did not refer to 
application of principle as a test for patentability.  Rather, the 
“invented or discovered . . . useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine or device” need only be “sufficiently useful and 
 
 103 Id. at 89.  The quoted language is by Fitch, who had apparently obtained a copy of 
H.R. 10; no copy of H.R. 10 is now known to survive. Id. at 88. 
 104 Id. at 102. 
 105 See id. at 117. 
 106 Id. at 118–19.  (emphasis added) (quoting PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS DURING THE 
YEARS 1789 AND 1790, RELATING TO THE FIRST PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAWS, 22 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y, at 364–65 (1940).  H.R. 44 was ultimately discarded in favor of H.R. 41, 
which addressed patents generally. See id. at 120. 
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important, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the 
United States.”107 
It became apparent shortly after enactment of the Patent Act of 
1790 that the administrative burdens on the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of War and the Attorney General, who made up the 
patent board,108 were excessive.  Jefferson, then Secretary of State, 
drafted a patent bill primarily intended to “reduce the ministerial 
requirements placed on the State Department and [Jefferson] in the 
issuance of patents.”109  The most significant of the changes that 
carried over into later proposed bills and, ultimately, the Patent Act 
of 1793 was introduction of a registration system to replace that of 
examination under the Patent Act of 1790.110 
Interestingly, Jefferson’s draft provided a defense to patent 
infringement where the invention “is so unimportant and obvious 
that it ought not to be the basis of an exclusive right.”111  This 
provision was not carried over into later proposals, and 
obviousness did not become a component of statutory patent law in 
the United States until the Patent Act of 1952.112  Jefferson’s draft 
also broadened the scope of patent-eligible subject matter to 
include any “composition of matter” and required a description of 
“the manner of using or process of compounding the same” along 
with “specimens of the ingredients, and of the composition of 
matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment.”113  
Jefferson’s draft bill, if it was introduced at all, was replaced by 
H.R. 166.114  In what appears to be an ode to importation, H.R. 166 
provided “[t]hat the monies to be paid, as directed by this act, into 
the treasury, shall be appropriated to the expense of procuring and 
importing useful arts or machines from foreign countries.”115  Like 
Jefferson’s defense to patent infringement, this provision was not 
 
 107 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
 108 See Patent Act of 1790 § 1. 
 109 WALTERSCHEID, supra, note 88, at 201. 
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. at 204. 
 112 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006)). 
 113 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 88, at 200. 
 114 See id. at 205. 
 115 Id. at 199. 
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included in what ultimately became the Patent Act of 1793.  
However, H.R. 166 further required that the inventor “fully explain 
the principle and the several modes, in which he has contemplated 
the application of that principle or character, by which it may be 
distinguished from other inventions.”116  This language, along with 
a proposal117 that the bill be amended to state that a “discovery” 
shall not consist of “changing the form or the proportions of any 
machine, or composition of matter, in any degree,” were adopted 
in the final bill that became the Patent Act of 1793.118 
Although the Patent Act of 1790 provided no more of a test for 
patentability than that of being “sufficiently useful and important,” 
the Patent Act of 1793 did provide for patent protection to “any 
person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle 
of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter.”119  
The type of principle is not specified and, given the broad meaning 
of both the terms “science” and “useful arts” of Article 1, Section 
8, Clause 8, the type of principle could be equally broad.  
However, as applied to patent protection, courts generally limited 
the scope of patent-eligibility to application of naturally-occurring 
principle.  Other types of principles, such as those limited to power 
only over other people—as in, for example, morality, religion, and 
government—appear never to have been the subject of patent 
protection, at least as adjudicated in the United States. 
Further, as stated above, the parallelism of the intellectual 
property clause provides Congress the authority to secure for 
“limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”120  Broadly interpreting the terms “Science” and 
“useful Arts,” and linking promotion of both the progress of 
“Science” and “useful Arts” to securing for limited times to 
inventors an exclusive right, does not imply an authority to grant 
Congress the right to secure such protection to individuals the 
exclusive right to discoveries that are mere observations.  The two 
 
 116 Id. at 207. 
 117 See id. at 222 n.96 (noting that the proposal may have been made by either Joseph 
Barnes or Thomas Jefferson). 
 118 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836). 
 119 Id.  
 120 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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terms, “inventors” and “discoveries,” were used in conjunction in 
the clause and, at that time, “discoveries,” in the context of 
inventorship implied some useful application of principle and its 
public disclosure, as opposed to mere observation. 
Utility and public possession of a discovery were, in fact, part 
of the exchange for an exclusionary right, and these prerequisites 
in the United States were consistent with British common law.  For 
example, as stated by Collier with respect to British common law: 
A patent is an agreement between the King and the 
Subject, that if the latter will put the public in 
possession of a useful secret, he shall have the 
exclusive benefit of that secret for the first fourteen 
years.  It is obvious, that if the public be already in 
possession of the discovery, the patentee can make 
no such return or compensation for the patent he 
obtains.121 
Therefore, even without the restraint of construction of the 
intellectual property clause under the Constitution, consistency 
with the British model of patentability strongly implies that the 
grant of an exclusionary right based on a “secret” observation by 
an inventor was linked to subsequent public disclosure of that 
observation and its use by the inventor. 
Godson went further and equated the word “inventor” with a 
“discoverer, or he who first finds out a thing, of which a limited 
monopoly may lawfully be granted.”122  He specifically stated that 
the application of a principle in the absence of its discovery was 
insufficient to make a patentee an “inventor.”123  Godson also 
linked determination of “a true and first inventor” under the Statute 
of Monopolies to public disclosure, stating that publication by 
another would defeat entitlement to patent protection as a matter of 
 
 121 JOHN DYER COLLIER, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 99 
(London, A. Wilson, 2d ed. 1803). 
 122 RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 
AND OF COPYRIGHT 26–27 (London, William Benning & Co. 1851). 
 123 Id. at 29 (“If the principle of the invention be taken from a scientific work the 
patentee is not an inventor.”). 
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policy “to insure an early production of the efforts of genius.”124  
Conversely, discovery of “objects of patents . . . new in England” 
must also be published in order for an individual to assume the 
“character of an inventor,” regardless of whether the invention was 
imported: 
Upon the whole, then, the character of an inventor 
may be obtained by a person in three ways, by 
bringing with him and publishing to his countrymen 
the productions of the genius of foreigners; by 
publishing what others as well as himself may have 
found out at home; or by publishing what he alone 
has discovered.125 
Therefore, at least in Great Britain, “discovery” was associated 
with application of a newly discovered principle and patent 
protection was contingent upon publication.126  So, consistent with 
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution, which, as 
argued by Walterscheid, does not preclude protection for imports, 
“discovery,” in the context of inventorship in Great Britain, from 
which patent protection in the United States was derived, implied 
application of a newly discovered principle, and patent protection 
was granted both to encourage advancement of such new 
application, as well as to disseminate knowledge through its 
publication. 
C.  Application of the Patent Act of 1793 
The interlocking nature of “inventorship,” “discovery” and 
“advancement of science and the useful arts” appears to have been 
carried over from England into U.S. jurisprudence.  Justice Story, 
in his note, “On the Patent Laws,”127 which appeared as an 
appendix to Justice Marshall’s opinion in Evans v. Eaton,128 
 
 124 Id. at 30 (“If two persons severally discover the same thing, the one who obtains a 
patent for it, before the other has made it public, will be adjudged to be ‘the true and first 
inventor’. . . . This rule is necessary to insure an early production of the efforts of 
genius.”). 
 125 Id. at 32. 
 126 See id.   
 127 Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 app. at 13–29 (1818). 
 128 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818). 
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quoted extensively the English Boulton129 and Hornblower130cases, 
stating that they “contain more learning on the subject of patents 
than can be found in any other adjudications.”131  As discussed 
above, in Hornblower, the Justices ultimately agreed that, in 
essence, although a patent may not be obtained for “mere 
principles,” methods of application of those principles may qualify 
as “manufactures” under section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies if 
the patentee “specifies the particular parts requisite to produce the 
effect intended, and states the manner how they are to be 
applied.”132 
In the United States, the question of how broadly the statutory 
categories under the Patent Act of 1793133 could be applied was 
not seriously tested; most cases instead focused on new application 
of principle as a threshold of patentable distinction over prior art or 
as a test of infringement.  For example, Chief Justice Marshall 
delivered the opinion in Evans v. Eaton, the first Supreme Court 
case to test patentable distinction.134  The patent at issue was 
directed to a flour mill known as a “hopper-boy.”135  Oliver Evans, 
the owner of the patent, claimed as his invention “the application 
of those principles . . . during the process of the manufacture . . . to 
the improvement of the process of manufacturing flour.136  
Elsewhere in the schedule, Evans strictly claimed the “peculiar 
properties or principles” possessed by his invention, namely “the 
spreading turning and gathering the meal at one operation, and the 
rising and lowering of its arms by its motion, to accommodate 
itself to any quantity of meal it has to operate on.”137 
 
 129 Boulton v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 463. 
 130 Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.); 8 T.R. 95. 
 131 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) app. at 18. 
 132 101 Eng. Rep. at 1290. 
 133 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836) (listing as 
categories “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter”). 
 134 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 454.  
 135 Id. at 455. 
 136 Id. at 463 n.b. 
 137 Id. at 468 n.b. 
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Justice Marshall reversed and annulled the lower court’s 
judgment for the defendant.138  Like the reasoning by the King’s 
Bench in Hornblower, the Court considered the “application of . . . 
principles” to be what Evans claimed as his “invention or 
improvement in the art.”139  In return for the exclusionary rights 
Evans was to receive,140 Marshall stated that Evans would have to 
enable others to understand the improvements he made.141  
Therefore, despite language to the effect that Evans was claiming 
“principles,” Justice Marshall construed the claim by Evans to 
extend only to the “application of these principles,” and only 
insofar as they represented “improvements.”142 
In 1822, the Supreme Court again considered Evans’ patent.143  
This time, Justice Story, writing for the Court, invalidated the 
patent despite the fact that its specification sufficiently described 
the improved hopper-boy, as well as its manner of construction.144  
According to Story, Evans’ claim to the “peculiar properties or 
principles which this machine possesses,”145 without “any other 
qualification . . . is just such a claim as would be made by the 
plaintiff, if the whole machine was substantially in its structure and 
combination new.”146  According to Story, without distinguishing 
the improvement from what was known, Evans claimed more 
protection than the Patent Act permitted.147  As stated by Story: 
From this enumeration of the provisions of the act, 
it is clear that the party cannot entitle himself to a 
patent for more than his own invention; and if his 
patent includes things before known, or before in 
use, as his invention, he is not entitled to recover, 
 
 138 See id. at 519. 
 139 Id. at 515. 
 140 Id. at 517. 
 141 Id. at 518 (“[I]t will be incumbent on him to show the extent of his improvement, so 
that a person understanding the subject may comprehend distinctly in what it consists.”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).   
 144 Id. at 428. 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 429.  The Patent Act, as paraphrased by Story, “authorizes a patent to the 
inventor, for his invention or improvement in any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter not known or used before the application.” Id.  
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for his patent is broader than his invention.  If, 
therefore, the patent be for the whole of a machine, 
the party can maintain a title to it only by 
establishing that it is substantially new in its 
structure and mode of operation.148 
Story expanded on Marshall’s requirement that the patentee 
“show the extent of his improvement, so that a person 
understanding the subject may comprehend distinctly in what it 
consists,”149 stating that the specification has two objects.150  The 
first object had an enabling function, to make known the manner of 
construction “so as to enable artisans to make and use it, and thus 
to give the public the full benefit of the discovery after the 
expiration of the patent.”151  The other object had a notice function, 
“to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own 
invention, so as to ascertain if he claim anything that is in common 
use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice or injury 
from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise 
innocently suppose not to be patented.”152  Since Evans’ 
specification did not “describe what his own improvement is, and 
to limit his patent to such improvement,”153 it was “defective for 
not specifying that improvement,” according to Story.154  
Therefore, whereas Marshall upheld the patent as a new 
application of principle contingent upon enabling others with its 
knowledge,155 Story invalidated the patent for having claimed, 
“without any other qualification,”156 the “peculiar properties or 
principles which this machine possesses,”157 thereby necessarily 
 
 148 Id. at 430. 
 149 Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 518 (1818). 
 150 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 433. 
 151 Id. at 433–34. 
 152 Id. at 434. 
 153 Id. at 435. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 518 (1818). 
 156 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 428. 
 157 Id. 
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extending the exclusive right beyond his improvement to the 
“whole machine” so improved.158 
Carry-over from England continued in Pennock v. Dialogue,159 
where Justice Story drew from the English case Wood v. Zimmer160 
to state that use of the word “invention” in the “context” of Wood 
meant “not the abstract discovery, but the thing invented; not the 
new secret principle, but the manufacture resulting from it.”161  
The “context” referred to by Story was a quotation from Lord 
Chief Justice Gibbs, who said, “[t]o entitle a man to a patent, the 
invention must be new to the world.  The public sale of that which 
is afterwards made the subject of the patent, though sold by the 
inventor only, makes the patent void.”162  Story also reiterated that 
the “main object” of the Patent Act of 1793 “was ‘to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts’”; and this could be done best, 
by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and 
vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible; having a 
due regard to the rights of the inventor.”163  A “reasonable reward 
to inventors” of an exclusive right to “stimulate the efforts of 
 
 158 See id. (“From this manner of stating his invention, without any other qualification, 
it is apparent that it is just such a claim as would be made use of by the plaintiff, if the 
whole machine was substantially in its structure and combinations new.”). 
 159 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). 
 160 Wood v. Zimmer, (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 161; 1 Holt. N.P. 58. 
 161 Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 20. 
 162 Id. (quoting Wood, 171 Eng. Rep. at 162.).  As discussed above, English common 
law under the Statute of Monopolies provided for exclusive rights for “the sole working 
or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm.” 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 
5.  The Patent Act of 1793 provided no such geographical limitation.  However, at least 
within the relevant territorial confines, Justice Story drew a parallel in Pennock between 
the sixth section of the Statute of Monopolies and the Patent Act of 1793 with respect to 
interpretation of the term “invention” and in the policy of barring patent protection 
subsequent to public use by the inventor.  Story stated that “the words of our statute are 
not identical with those of the Statute of James, but it can scarcely admit of doubt, that 
they must have been within the contemplation of those by whom it was framed, as well as 
the construction which had been put upon them by Lord Coke.” Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
at 20–21.  Coke, in turn, in his commentary upon the sixth section of the Statute of 
Monopolies, stated that “if any other did use it at the making of the letters patent, or grant 
of the privilege, it is declared and enacted to be void by this act.” Id. at 20.  According to 
Story, Coke’s “use here referred to has always been understood to be a public use, and 
not a private or surreptitious use in fraud of the inventor.” Id. 
 163 Pennock, 27 U.S. (2. Pet.) at 19. 
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genius” was considered to be of secondary importance in Story’s 
view.164 
In Whitney v. Emmett,165 Justice Baldwin, while riding circuit, 
upheld a patent166 directed to a method for manufacturing glass 
knobs.167  Like Justice Story, Justice Baldwin held that a new 
invention cannot consist of the “discovery of some new principle, 
theory, elementary truth, or an improvement upon it, abstracted 
from its application.”168  Rather, the invention lies in the 
application of that discovery or principle.169  Further, Justice 
Baldwin extended the scope of the patentable subject matter to a 
“method of doing a thing,” and, as did the King’s Bench in 
Hornblower, effectively equated methods with the means by which 
they are practiced.170 
Justice Story also equated method and means.  In Ames v. 
Howard,171 Justice Story upheld the construction of a claim 
directed to a cylinder “for the purpose of making paper.”172  
According to Story, “[i]t requires no commentary to establish, that 
the application of an old thing to a new use, without any other 
invention, is not a patentable contrivance,”173 but that a patentee 
may claim “the construction and use of the peculiar cylinder above 
described, and the several parts thereof in combination for the 
purpose aforesaid,”174 that is, for the purpose of making paper.  As 
did Justice Baldwin in Whitney, therefore, Story linked the 
 
 164 See id. 
 165 Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585). 
 166 See id. at 1083. 
 167 See id. at 1079. 
 168 Id. at 1078. 
 169 Id. (“[W[hen such discovery is applied to any practical purpose, in the new 
construction, operation or effects of machinery or composition of matter, producing a 
new substance, or an old one in a new way . . . . [I]t is a ‘discovery,’ ‘invention’ or 
‘improvement’ within the acts of congress.”). 
 170 Id. (“[A] patent for a mode or method detached from all physical application, would 
not refer to an engine or machine, but when referred to the mode of operation, so as to 
produce the effect, would be considered as for an engine or a machine.”). 
 171 Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 326). 
 172 See id. at 757. 
 173 Id.  
 174 Id. at 756. 
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patentability of the method with that of the machinery by which 
the method is conducted. 
D. Continuity Under the Patent Act of 1836 
Even under a new patent act, U.S. courts continued to find that 
new application of a principle was a benchmark for qualification as 
statutory subject matter.  In 1836, a new patent act was enacted in 
the United States;175 among other things, it reinstituted substantive 
examination of patent applications and eliminated the language in 
the Patent Act of 1793, stating “that simply changing the form or 
proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any 
degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.”176  Nevertheless, new 
application of principle as a threshold for patent eligibility 
continued.  For example, in Blanchard v. Sprague,177 Justice Story 
upheld the subject patent because there was “described, not a mere 
function, but a machine of a particular structure, whose modes of 
operation are pointed out, to accomplish a particular purpose, 
function, or end.”178  The fact that the specification linked the 
invention’s function to a “particular machine” justified a 
determination that the machine complied with the “liberal 
construction”179 to which patents, in Story’s view, were clearly 
entitled.180  Therefore, Justice Story, just as he had done in Ames, 
linked patentability of practice with the patentability of a particular 
machine as an expression of application of a principle. 
Justice Story continued to demand particularity from patentees.  
In Stone v. Sprague,181 Justice Story held that a “patentee limits his 
invention to the specific machinery and mode . . . set forth, and 
 
 175 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (amended 1870, repealed 1952). 
 176 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836). 
 177 Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518). 
 178 Id. at 650. 
 179 See id. (“Patents, then, are clearly entitled to a liberal construction, since they are not 
granted as restrictions upon the rights of the community, but are granted ‘to promote 
science and useful arts.’”). 
 180 Id. (“[I]t is a particular machine, constituted in the way pointed out, for the 
accomplishment of a particular end or object.  The patent is for a machine, and not for a 
principle or function detached from machinery.”). 
 181 Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161 (C.C.D.R.I.1840) (No. 13,487). 
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specifically described in the specification.”182  To do otherwise 
would be “an attempt to maintain a patent for an abstract principle, 
or for all possible and probable modes whatsoever . . . although 
they may be invented by others, and substantially differ from the 
mode described by the plaintiff in the specification.”183   
Similarly, in Wyeth v. Stone,184 Justice Story again 
distinguished between attempts to patent a principle and its 
application.  Story held, as “utterly unmaintainable in point of 
law,”185 a claim “to cut ice of a uniform size, by means of an 
apparatus or by any other power than human.”186  According to 
Story, such a claim was “broader than the actual invention of the 
patentee,” and therefore constituted a “claim for an art or principle 
in the abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery, by 
which ice is to be cut.”187  “Upon the principles of the common 
law,” such a claim was “utterly void, and the patent is a nullity.”188  
Story further stated that, nevertheless, several embodiments of an 
invention could be embraced within the scope of a single patent on 
the basis that they shared a common application of principle.189 
In Howe v. Abbott,190 Justice Story again appeared to link new 
application of principle to patentable invention.  Here, he found 
that the application of an old process to the manufacture of 
something new is not patentable.191  To be entitled to a patent, 
there “must be some new process, or some new machinery used, to 
produce the result.”192  Likewise, according to Story, “[h]e, who 
produces an old result by a new mode or process, is entitled to a 
patent for that mode or process.  But he cannot have a patent for a 
result merely, without using some new mode or process to produce 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 162. 
 184 Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107). 
 185 Id. at 727. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 729. (“[H]e might lawfully unite in one patent all the modes, in which he 
contemplated the application of his invention, and all the different sorts of machinery, or 
modifications of machinery, by which or to which it might be applied . . . .”). 
 190 Howe v. Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 656 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766). 
 191 Id. at 658. 
 192 Id. 
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it.”193  Story thereby squarely placed methods within the scope of 
statutory subject matter and, interestingly, divorced the 
patentability of methods from a need to link them to novelty of 
machinery employed to conduct the method or to obtain the result 
produced. 
Howe can be better understood when viewed in comparison 
with Bean v. Smallwood,194 in which Story stated that “the thing 
itself which is to be patented must be new and not the mere 
application of it to a new purpose or object.”195  Taken together, 
Howe and Bean can only be reconciled by understanding that 
although both a machine and a method of its operation or use may 
be an embodiment of principle, the principle need not be the same.  
Further, considering Story’s dicta in Wyeth—asserting that several 
modes sharing a common principle can be embraced within a 
single patent—both an apparatus and method of its use, if they 
indeed share a common application of principle, should be 
considered a single invention.  This conclusion is consistent with 
Judge Lawrence’s opinion in Hornblower, whereby Watt’s 
application of principle as a method could be construed to be a 
manufacture within the meaning of the Statute of James.196 
In 1853, Justice McLean for the Supreme Court in LeRoy v. 
Tatham197 distinguished between “principle” in the abstract and its 
application under patent law: 
The word principle is used by elementary writers on 
patent subjects, and sometimes in adjudications of 
courts, with such a want of precision in its 
application, as to mislead.  It is admitted, that a 
principle is not patentable.  A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
claim in either of them an exclusive right.  Nor can 
an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,173). 
 195 Id. at 1143. 
 196 See Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.) 1291–92; 8 T.R. 
105–07; supra note 61and accompanying text. 
 197 LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853). 
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be discovered in addition to those already 
known. . . . 
 In all such cases, the processes used to extract, 
modify, and concentrate natural agencies, 
constitute the invention.  The elements of the power 
exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but 
in applying them to useful objects.198 
The language employed by Justice McLean implies that the 
types of principle—i.e., the type of “fundamental truth,” “original 
cause” or “motive”—are “natural agencies” that are discovered.  
Although not discussed by McLean, his characterization of 
agencies as “natural” can only mean that the patentability of their 
application stands in contrast to application of agencies that are not 
natural.  Principles that are a product of mankind—such as 
government, religious tenets, morality, etiquette and custom—
would not qualify, and it appears that courts generally relied on 
that assumption.  Justice McLean, for example, drew from 
Househill Company v. Nielson,199 which stated that a “patent will 
be good though the subject of the patent consists of the discovery 
of a great, general, and most comprehensible principle in science 
or law of nature, if that principle is by the specification applied to 
any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result 
and benefit not previously attained.”200  Justice McLean appeared 
also to echo Justice Story’s prohibition in Howe against obtaining a 
“patent for a result merely,”201 by stating that “[a] patent is not 
good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would 
prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any 
means whatsoever.”202 
In O’Reilly v. Morse,203 the Supreme Court upheld seven of 
eight claims of Samuel F. B. Morse’s patent directed to his 
telegraph and its use, but denied granting Morse exclusivity to a 
 
 198 Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added). 
 199 Househill Company v. Nielson, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 616; 1 Web. P.C. 673. 
 200 LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added) (quoting Househill, 1 Web. P.C. at 683). 
 201 Howe v. Abbot, 12 F. Cas. 656, 658 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 171–74. 
 202 LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175. 
 203 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
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principle apart from its embodiment.204  The eighth claim expressly 
stated that Morse’s invention was not limited to any “specific 
machinery, or parts of machinery, described in the foregoing 
specifications and claims.”205  Instead, Morse was to be bound only 
by the “essence of my invention,” which was stated to be “the use 
of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing 
intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a 
new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first 
inventor or discoverer.”206  Justice Taney, for the Court, stated that 
the terms of the claim were clear: “It is impossible to 
misunderstand the extent of this claim.  He claims the exclusive 
right to every improvement where the motive power is the electric 
or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing 
intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”207 
The Court’s denial of the eight claim’s validity appears to have 
been based on policy grounds, in that the patentee “shuts the door 
against inventions of other persons, [while] the patentee would be 
able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties and 
powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring to 
light.”208  Therefore, the Court held that “the claim is too broad, 
and not warranted by law.”209  The Court distinguished Morse’s 
eighth claim from Neilson v. Harford.210  There, the Court of 
Exchequer upheld a patent claim directed to a method for 
“throwing hot air into [a] furnace, instead of cold, and thereby 
 
 204 See id. at 113. 
 205 Id. at 112. 
 206 See id.  Morse’s eighth claim was as follows: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of 
machinery, described in the foregoing specification and claims; the 
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the 
electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however 
developed for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or 
signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of 
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer. 
Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 See id. at 113. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rpt. 1266 (Exch. Div.); 8 M. & W. 806. 
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increasing the intensity of the heat”211 and to the efficiency of 
“fires, forges, and furnaces, where a blowing apparatus is 
required.”212  Despite the fact that Neilson claimed no particular 
mode of constructing the receptacle213 to embody “the principle 
that hot air will promote the ignition of fuel better than cold,”214 
the court upheld Neilson’s patent because he “had invented a 
mechanical mode of applying [the principle] to furnaces; and that 
his invention consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, between 
the blower and the furnace, and by this means heating the air after 
it left the blower, and before it was thrown into the fire.”215 
Morse, on the other hand, claimed the exclusive use of 
communication at a distance by “electric or galvanic current,” 
regardless of the means.216  This, in contrast to Neilson, went too 
far and represented to the Court an attempt to claim exclusive use 
of a principle disembodied from its application.217  Public 
disclosure was also a factor underlying the policy denying 
protection to exclusive use of principle apart from any limitation 
 
 211 O’Reilly at 115 (citing Nielson, 151 Eng. Rpt. at 1266). 
 212 Id. at 114 (citing Nielson, 151 Eng. Rpt. at 1266). 
 213 Id. at 115.  As stated by the Court in O’Reilly with reference to Neilson:  
We see nothing in this opinion differing in any degree from the 
familiar principles of law applicable to patent cases.  Neilson claimed 
no particular mode of constructing the receptacle, or of heating it.  He 
pointed out the manner in which it might be done, but admitted that it 
might also be done in a variety of ways; and at a higher or lower 
temperature; and that all of them would produce the effect in a 
greater or less degree, provided the air was heated by passing through 
a heated receptacle.  And hence it seems that the court at first 
doubted, whether it was a patent for any thing more than the 
discovery that hot air would promote the ignition of fuel better than 
cold. 
Id. at 115–16. 
 214 Id. at 116. 
 215 See id.  As stated by the court:  
But after much consideration, it was finally decided that this principle 
must be regarded as well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a 
mechanical mode of applying it to furnaces; and that his invention 
consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, between the blower and 
the furnace, and by this means heating the air after it left the blower, 
and before it was thrown into the fire. 
Id. 
 216 See id. at 112. 
 217 See id. at 116. 
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on its embodiment.218  The Court, therefore, refused Morse’s 
claimed “exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has 
not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not 
describe when he obtained his patent.”219 
The Supreme Court in Burr v. Duryee220 again limited 
protection and held that the reissue of a valid patent to broaden 
claims to cover all modes by which the object of the invention is to 
be achieved would constitute “an attempt to convert an improved 
machine into an abstraction, a principle or mode of operation, or a 
still more vague and indefinite entity often resorted to in argument, 
an ‘idea.’”221  Similarly, notice appeared to be the basis for the 
Court’s holding: 
The great question of the case is, whether the 
Boyden machine infringes the patent originally 
granted to Wells for his invention; and if not, 
whether his assignees, by the use or abuse of the 
right to surrender and reissue their patent, can so 
expand it as to cover by ex post facto operation, all 
subsequent inventions.222 
In sum, consistent with development of case law prior to the 
Patent Act of 1836, new application of principle or, more 
specifically, new physical application of naturally-occurring 
principle, continued to be the touchstone of statutory subject 
matter, despite removal of language explicitly barring patent 
protection where the invention represented “simply changing the 
form or proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in 
any degree.”223 
 
 218 Id. at 113 (“And if he can secure the exclusive use by his present patent, he may 
vary it with a new discovery and development of science, and need place no description 
of the new manner, process, or machinery, upon the records of the patent office.  And 
when the patent expires, the public must apply to him to learn what it is.”). 
 219 Id. at 113. 
 220 Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531 (1864). 
 221 Id. at 577. 
 222 Id. at 566. 
 223 See supra text accompanying notes 175–76. 
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II. THE FALL OF THE APPLICATION OF NATURALLY-OCCURRING 
PRINCIPLE AS A THRESHOLD FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
A. Challenges Prior to the Patent Act of 1952 
Until the mid 1860s, the classification of subject matter within 
the statutory categories of the patent acts was not generally a point 
of controversy.  Most inventions were directed to machines and 
methods of their use.  Further, courts in the United States typically 
found that machines and methods of their use were equivalent 
when both embraced a common application of principle and, when 
they constituted different inventions, the courts required each to be 
a manifestation of some new application of principle. 
Eventually, however, and inevitably, the variety of subject 
matter for which applicants sought protection would begin to test 
the limits of the statutory categories available for exclusionary 
protection.  In 1876, for example, the Supreme Court decided 
Cochrane v. Deener,224 which would later figure prominently in 
qualification of statutory subject matter.225  In Cochrane, the Court 
held that a method for purifying the millings of flour practiced by 
the defendants infringed the plaintiff’s patent because the only 
differences were, albeit improvements, “a mere matter of form” of 
the equipment employed to perform the method, despite the 
existence of a later patent of a third party from which the 
defendants had a license, covering machines that conduct their 
process.226  The Court stated that claimed processes can be 
practiced by different “instrumentalities” and still be patentable: 
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of 
the particular form of the instrumentalities used, 
cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode of 
treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result.  It is an act, or a series of acts, performed 
upon the subject matter to be transformed and 
reduced to a different state or thing.  If new and 
useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of 
 
 224 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
 225 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972). 
 226 Id. at 786–87. 
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machinery.  In the language of the patent law, it is 
an art.  The machinery pointed out as suitable to 
perform the process may or may not be new or 
patentable; whilst the process itself may be 
altogether new, and produce an entirely new result.  
The process requires that certain things should be 
done with certain substances, and in certain order; 
but the tools to be used in doing this may be of 
secondary consequence.227 
Note that the Court did not say that in order to qualify as a 
statutory process the claimed subject matter must employ a 
machine or transform material, but rather said only that machines 
and processes that did transform materials qualified as an “art,” 
and that the bases for patentability of a method and the apparatus 
for conducting that method can be distinct. 
In Baker v. Selden,228 the Supreme Court distinguished 
between protections afforded by copyright and by patent.  The 
Court found that the copyright in a book describing a method of 
bookkeeping—and including forms and blanks illustrating the 
system and showing how it is to be used and carried out in 
practice—did not protect the author against another’s use of the 
system or the forms employed to illustrate the system.  The Court 
stated: 
The description of the art in a book, though entitled 
to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an 
exclusive claim to the art itself.  The object of the 
one is explanation; the object of the other is use.  
The former may be secured by copyright.  The latter 
can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by 
letters-patent.229 
 
 227 Id. at 787–88. 
 228 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 229 Id. at 105. 
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The Court, however, did not opine upon whether the subject 
matter from the book was patentable,230 nor did it decide whether 
the forms themselves were patentable subject matter.231 
In Munson v. City of New York,232 the Court addressed the 
patentability of a system of book-keeping.233  The Court found that 
“there was no patentable novelty in plaintiff’s scheme,”234 and, 
therefore, it could not “be held to involve any invention.”235  The 
Court made a point of not expressing any opinion as to whether the 
subject matter of the patent could be “considered as an ‘art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ within the 
meaning of the patent laws.”236  Rather, acting on the presumption 
that it did, it avoided the issue by invalidating the patent for lack of 
novelty over the prior art.237 
A few years later, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of 
New York, in United States Credit System v. American Credit 
Indemnity,238 relied on Baker to hold that forms employed in an 
insurance practice were not “new to persons skilled in that art, and 
could not amount to any patentable invention or discovery.”239  
The court also contrasted Munson, which “was for a contrivance to 
preserve paid coupons and bonds, and might be patentable as a 
machine or manufacture,”240 with the patent at issue, which was 
“for a method of transacting common business.”241  Without 
further explanation, the court held that the method “does not seem 
to be patentable as an art.”242 
 
 230 Id. at 104. (“Whether the art might or might not have been patented, is a question 
which is not before us.  It was not patented, and is open free to the use of the public.”).   
 231 Id. (“And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must 
necessarily be used as incident to it.”). 
 232 Munson v. City of New York, 124 U.S. 601 (1888). 
 233 Id. at 604. 
 234 Id.. at 604–05. 
 235 Id. at 605. 
 236 Id. at 604. 
 237 Id. at 604–05. 
 238 53 F. 818 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893). 
 239 Id. at 818–19. 
 240 Id. at 819. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
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Novelty was also implicated in other tests of statutory subject 
matter.  For example, a process of preserving fruit by exposure to 
borax (sodium borate) was held to be unpatentable by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. 
Brogdex Co.243  In deciding, the Court drew on a definition of 
“manufacture” as “the production of articles for use from raw or 
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, 
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by 
machinery,” and “anything made for use from raw or prepared 
materials.”244  The Court disputed the lower court’s conclusion that 
the “product is a combination of the natural fruit and a boric 
compound . . . to render the fruit resistant to decay . . . and is thus 
an article of manufacture,”245 because there was “no change in the 
name, appearance or general character of the fruit.  It remains a 
fresh orange fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore,” 
thereby disqualifying the claimed subject matter from qualification 
as a “manufacture” under the statute.246 
In a case which later would be described as the origin of the 
“mental steps” doctrine,247 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker,248 decided that “an 
improvement in the method of counterbalancing engine main 
shafts”249 was an attempt to monopolize a “formula for 
determining dynamic forces, and this although those forces were 
fully recognized and considered by engineers in published text-
books long before the appellee applied for his patent.”250  This 
decision by the court closely paralleled earlier decisions that 
rationalized denial of patentability on the basis of lack of novelty 
where there was a previous understanding of the principle or its 
general application. 
 
 243 American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931). 
 244 Id.  
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 12. 
 247 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (describing Don Lee, Inc. v. 
Walker as the “genesis” of the mental step concept). 
 248 Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932). 
 249 Id. at 58. 
 250 Id. at 62. 
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The Supreme Court weighed in with respect to the scope and 
validity of claims directed to application of an empirical formula in 
MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America.251  As 
stated by the Court, if such a claim is to be considered valid, it 
would only be by limiting the claim to “structure conforming to the 
teachings” of the subject matter of the patent: 
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical 
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel 
and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be. . . . We 
assume, without deciding the point, that this 
advance was invention even though it was achieved 
by the logical application of a known scientific law 
to a familiar type of antenna.  But it is apparent that 
if this assumption is correct the invention was a 
narrow one . . . and is to be strictly construed with 
regard both to prior art and to alleged infringing 
devices.252 
Again, qualification as statutory subject matter was linked to 
the novelty of claims that were viewed to embody physical 
application of scientific principle.  Patent eligibility hung on 
evidence that the application of principle was novel, and not a 
preemption of the principle altogether. 
The Supreme Court continued to emphasize the importance of 
novelty in the statutory subject matter context.  In Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,253 the Court held unpatentable, claims 
directed to combinations of strains of root nodule bacteria that did 
not mutually inhibit each other’s ability to fix nitrogen from air in 
specific leguminous plants, such as clover, alfalfa and soy beans.254  
The claims were not limited to any particular combination of 
nitrogen-fixing bacterial strains, but rather claimed any 
combination of strains that were “unaffected by each other in 
respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for 
 
 251 306 U.S. 86 (1939). 
 252 Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
 253 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 254 See id. at 132. 
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which they are specific.”255  Applying such combinations, farmers 
could avoid having to purchase strains of bacteria that were 
specific to crops they intended to plant.  It had previously been 
thought that any combination of such inoculants would be 
mutually inhibiting.256   
The Court held that, because the use of the bacterial strains in 
combination did not “improve in any way their natural 
functioning,” they “serve the ends of nature originally provided 
and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”257  
Therefore, although the inventor, Bond, “made a new and different 
composition of non-inhibitive strains which contributed utility and 
economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial 
inoculants . . . we think that that aggregation of species fell short 
of invention within the meaning of patent statutes.”258  In other 
words, despite the fact that Bond’s “aggregation of select strains 
of the several species into one product is an application of that 
newly-discovered natural principle [of lack of inhibition],” and 
despite the fact that “it may have been the product of skill,” the 
Court found that “it certainly was not the product of invention.”259  
By disqualifying the claimed subject matter for lack of 
“invention,” the Court appears, again, to be basing a holding 
regarding statutory subject matter on novelty.  Specifically, the 
Court held that Bond’s claim to any combination of non-inhibiting 
 
 255 Id. at 128 n.1. 
 256 Id. at 130 (“Hence it had been assumed that the different species were mutually 
inhibitive.  Bond discovered that there are strains of each species of root-nodule bacteria 
which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other.”). 
 257 Id. at 131. 
 258 Id. at 130–31 (emphasis added). 
 259 Id. at 131–32 (emphasis added).  The Court relied on Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. 
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941), to state that “a product must be more than 
new and useful to be patented; it must satisfy the requirements of invention or 
discovery.” Funk Bros., 33 U.S. at 131.  The Court in Cuno, significantly, held that a 
“new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not 
merely the skill of the calling.” Cuno, 314 U.S. at 91.  This language in Cuno was 
severely criticized in later cases and, ultimately, qualified by the Supreme Court in 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (1965), as being merely “rhetorical 
embellishment of language going back to 1833.”   
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mixed inoculants was “no more than the discovery of some of the 
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.”260 
B. Erecting the Crystal Palace of Patent Eligibility Tests 
1. “Mental Steps,” “Technological Arts” and “Machine-or-
Transformation” Tests 
a) Mental Steps 
The Patent Act of 1952261 substituted the word “art” with 
“process” in order to avoid a conflict with the meaning of the same 
word in other parts of Title 35.262  In 1951, just before the passage 
of the Patent Act of 1952, the United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) was in “accord” in In re Abrams263 with 
three “suggested ‘rules of law’”264 for addressing mental steps in 
statutory subject matter.  The rules were proposed by the appellant, 
whose patent application for a “Petroleum Prospecting Method” 
was rejected by the Board of Appeals in the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).  The rules were: 
 1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely 
mental in character, the subject matter thereof is not 
patentable within the meaning of the patent statutes. 
 
 260 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
 261 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 262 As stated in the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952: 
Section 101 follows the wording of the existing statute as to the 
subject matter for patents, except that reference to plant patents has 
been omitted for incorporation in section 301 and the word ‘art’ has 
been replaced by ‘process,’ which is defined in section 100.  The 
word ‘art’ in the corresponding section of the existing statute has a 
different meaning than the same word as used in other places in the 
statute; it has been interpreted by the courts as being practically 
synonymous with process or method.  ‘Process’ has been used as its 
meaning is more readily grasped than ‘art’ as interpreted, and the 
definition in section 100(b) makes it clear that ‘process or method’ is 
meant.   
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2409–10 (1952). 
 263 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
 264 Id. at 167 (“From such examination of the decisions as we have been able to make, 
the suggested rules appear to accord with them . . . .”).  
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 2. If a method claim embodies both positive and 
physical steps as well as so-called mental steps, yet 
the alleged novelty or advance over the art resides 
in one or more of the so-called mental steps, then 
the claim is considered unpatentable for the same 
reason that it would be if all the steps were purely 
mental in character. 
 3. If a method claim embodies both positive and 
physical steps, as well as so-called mental steps, yet 
the novelty or advance over the art resides in one or 
more of the positive and physical steps and the so-
called mental step or steps are incidental parts of the 
process which are essential to define, qualify or 
limit its scope, then the claim is patentable and not 
subject to the objection contained in 1 and 2 
above.265 
The court held that the “advance in the art” of the claimed six-
step method of Abrams was that of “comparing data” and, 
therefore, the process fell into the second “rule,” as opposed to the 
third, as advocated by the appellants.266 
In In re Prater,267 the CCPA addressed a case of first 
impression268 and affirmed a decision by the Board of Appeals 
rejecting method claims directed to “processing, or analysis, of 
conventionally obtained spectrographic data.”269  According to the 
court, “[w]hether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes 
within the bounds of ‘process’ as used in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 and 101 
is, we feel, an issue which has never been squarely decided.”270  
The Prater court, however, refrained from stating that patentable 
processes must have physical application, and attempted to explain 
Supreme Court precedent, namely Cochrane,271 which the court 
 
 265 Id. at 166. 
 266 Id. at 170. (“[I]t seems to us that they are eliminated from the applicability of 
appellants proposed rule 3, and fall within No. 2.”). 
 267 In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 268 Id. at 1401. 
 269 Id. at 1395. 
 270 Id. at 1402 n.23. 
 271 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). 
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quoted, in part: “A process is a mode of treatment of certain 
materials to produce a given result.  It is an act, or a series of acts, 
performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced 
to a different state or thing.”272  Specifically, the court in Prater 
disputed any categorical limitation by the Supreme Court in 
Cochrane on qualification of “processes” as statutory subject 
matter that limits the means by which they are carried out: 
This passage [from Cochrane] has sometimes been 
misconstrued as a “rule” or “definition” requiring 
that all processes, to be patentable, must operate 
physically upon substances.  Such a result 
misapprehends the nature of the passage quoted as 
dictum, in its context, and the question being 
discussed by the author of the opinion.  To deduce 
such a rule from the statement would be contrary to 
its intendment which was not to limit process 
patentability but to point out that a process is not 
limited to the means used in performing it.273 
The Supreme Court, according to the court in Prater, did not 
preclude a sequence of purely mental steps from qualifying as 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.274  Earlier cases, 
such as Abrams,275 which denied patent eligibility, were 
distinguished as being confined to processes, or “the critical step 
thereof” that “required the use of the human mind—indeed, a 
purely mental process or step,” whereas the claimed method in 
Prater could be practiced either by mental steps or without human 
intervention.276  In other words, a method claim will not be barred 
from 35 U.S.C. § 101 protection under the “mental steps” doctrine 
 
 272 Prater, 415 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788). 
 273 Id. at 1403. 
 274 Id. at 1402 n.23 (“Whether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes within 
the bounds of ‘process’ as used in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 and 101 is, we feel, an issue which 
has never been squarely decided.”). 
 275 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
 276 Prater, 415 F.2d at 1402 (“But, as appellants point out, ‘Yuan’s disclosure was the 
use made of equations by pencil-and-paper with the mind of the operator at work to 
interpret the results.’  Again, as in Abrams, insofar as the disclosure was concerned, the 
process (or the critical step thereof) was one that required the use of the human mind—
indeed, a purely mental process or step.”).          
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despite the fact that it consists of a sequence of purely mental 
steps, so long as the method does not exclude, and the specification 
supports, mechanical substitution of the entire method.  The court 
summarized: “[I]t would appear that the disclosure of apparatus for 
performing the process wholly without human intervention merely 
shows that the disclosed process does not fall within the so-called 
‘mental steps’ exclusion.”277 
b) Technological Arts 
Judge Rich for the CCPA, in In re Musgrave,278 reiterated 
Prater’s reasoning and more broadly stated that “novelty and 
advancement of an art are irrelevant to . . . whether the nature of a 
process is such that it is encompassed by the meaning of ‘process’ 
in 35 U.S.C. § 101.”279  The only requirement provided by Judge 
Rich for qualification as a “process” under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that 
it be directed to the “technological arts”: “All that is necessary, in 
our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory 
‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological 
arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to 
promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’”280  However, Judge Rich did 
not specify what was meant by the term “technological arts.”  
Further, Judge Rich noted that Don Lee,281 which was the genesis 
of the “mental steps” concept of patent law, provided only “an 
uncertain basis as precedent” for this holding.282  Rich also stated 
 
 277 Id. at 1403. 
 278 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A 1970). 
 279 Id. at 889–90.  The court referred to an article from the Journal of the Patent Office 
Society reciting “peculiarly human mental activities” that would exclude, at least in 
principle, assistance “by devices.” See id. at 890 n.4 (quoting Robert I. Coulter, The Field 
of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 417, 426 (1952)).  Such activities 
included “aesthetic, emotional, imaginative, or a creative thought or reactions on the part 
of the practitioners (operators).” Id. (quoting Coulter, supra, at 426).  Further, with 
respect to the technological “mental steps” cases, “the article stated that, ‘[n]one of the 
them involve human ‘value judgments’—that is, judgments on human conduct, ethics, 
morals, economics, politics, law, aesthetics, etc.’” See id. (quoting Coulter, supra, at 
426). 
 280 Musgrave, 431 F.2d. at 893. 
 281 See Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932). 
 282 See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 889. 
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that the so-called “‘Rules’ of Abrams . . . have never enjoyed the 
approval of this court.”283 
c) Machine-or-Transformation 
A method for converting numerals from “binary-coded decimal 
numbers” to “pure binary numbers” was held by the Supreme 
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson284 to be unpatentable as an 
“algorithm”285 that “can be carried out in existing computers long 
in use, no new machinery being necessary [and] can also be 
performed without a computer.”286  The Court quoted Cochrane,287 
stating that “a process may be patentable, irrespective of the 
particular form of the instrumentalities used,”288 but added that 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or 
a thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does 
not include particular machines.”289  The Court refrained from 
holding that “a process patent must either be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or 
materials to a ‘different state or thing,’”290 and specifically denied 
they were precluding patent protection for any computer-servicing 
program.291  However, with respect to the applicant’s method, the 
Court held that the “practical effect” would be to “patent an idea,” 
which “would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and . . . 
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”292 
 
 283 Id.  
 284 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 285 Id. at 65. 
 286 Id. at 67. 
 287 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877).  
 288 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88). 
 289 Id. at 70 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88). 
 290 Id. at 71.  Justice Douglas, for the Court, stated: 
It is argued that a patent process must either be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials 
to a “different state or thing.”  We do not hold that no process patent 
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents. 
Id. 
 291 See id. (“It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a 
computer.  We do not so hold.”). 
 292 Id. at 71–72. 
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2. Algorithms, Abstract Ideas, Naturally-Occurring 
Phenomena and “Post-Solution Activity” 
The CCPA developed the Benson holding into a two-step test 
in In re Freeman.293  There, the patent was directed to a system for 
printing mathematical formulae that positioned “mathematical 
symbols in an expression in accordance with their appearance, 
while maintaining the mathematical integrity of the expression.”294  
The court reasoned: 
Determination of whether a claim preempts 
nonstatutory subject matter as a whole, in the light 
of Benson, requires a two-step analysis.  First, it 
must be determined whether the claim directly or 
indirectly recites an “algorithm” in the Benson 
sense of that term, for a claim which fails even to 
recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt 
an algorithm.  Second, the claim must be further 
analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it 
wholly preempts that algorithm.295 
Both apparatus and method claims of the patent were upheld as 
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because neither the 
“apparatus claims nor the . . . method claims recite or preempt a 
mathematical algorithm as forbidden by Benson.”296 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court again took up the issue 
of statutory subject matter in Parker v. Flook.297  Justice Stevens 
for the Court held that a method for updating alarm limits during 
catalytic conversion processes was not patentable under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.298  Justice Stevens stated that “we assume the respondent’s 
formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it.”299  
However, Justice Stevens warned that “post-solution activity,” 
such as computing an updated alarm limit, “no matter how 
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable 
 
 293 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 294 Id. at 1239. 
 295 Id. at 1245. 
 296 Id. at 1247. 
 297 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 298 See id. at 594–95. 
 299 Id. at 588. 
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principle into a patentable process [and, therefore] exalts form over 
substance.”300  The Court refuted the assumption that “if a process 
application implements a principle in some specific fashion, it 
automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of § 
101.”301  Instead, the Court stated that “[t]he rule that the discovery 
of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that 
natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more 
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of 
‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”302  Otherwise, 
according to the Court, “determination of patentable subject matter 
[would] depend simply on the draftsman’s art and would ill serve 
the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ‘ideas’ 
or phenomena of nature.”303 
Further, the Court did not view its analysis to be one of 
dissection of claimed subject matter, whereby “if the only 
component found novel is outside the statutory classes of 
invention, the claim may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”304  
The claimed method would be unpatentable under section 101 “not 
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, 
but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior 
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention.”305  Nevertheless, “[e]ven though a phenomenon of 
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive 
application of the principle may be patented.”306  Therefore, 
qualification of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, for 
the Court, depended upon “inventive application”307 of principle, 
and claimed subject matter might fail the test despite the fact that 
the novel application of a formula discovered by an applicant is 
useful.  The Court stated: “Very simply, our holding today is that a 
 
 300 Id. at 590. 
 301 Id. at 593. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. at 594 (quoting In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. (emphasis added). 
 307 Id. (emphasis added). 
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claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a 
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”308 
Three justices—including Chief Justice Burger—dissented 
from the majority opinion.  Justice Stewart, for the dissent, stated 
that the majority confused issues of qualification as statutory 
subject matter patentability with issues of novelty and 
inventiveness under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103: 
The Court today says it does not turn its back on 
well-settled precedents . . . but it strikes what seems 
to me an equally damaging blow at basic principles 
of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and 
inventiveness.  Section 101 is concerned only with 
subject-matter patentability.  Whether a patent will 
actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 
and 103, which include novelty and inventiveness, 
among many others.309 
The CCPA in In re Sarkar310 held that a method for 
“mathematically modeling an open channel, e.g., a natural stream 
or artificial waterway”311 was not a “process” within the meaning 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 because an “algorithm” in the claim reduced 
the “invention as a whole” to a “mathematical exercise.”312  
Physical steps of “gathering and substituting values” for the 
algorithm would, according to the court, cause “every 
mathematical equation, formula, or algorithm having any practical 
use . . . [to] be per se subject to patenting as a ‘process’ under § 
 
 308 Id. at 595 n.18. 
 309 Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 310 In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 311 Id. at 1330. 
 312 See id. at 1336.  The court stated: 
Sarkar’s claimed invention as a whole consists of a mathematical 
exercise, wherein a new formula is provided, formula-dictated values 
are gathered and substituted for the variables in that formula, and the 
calculations required by the formula are made.  Sarkar’s offer to 
disclose his process by patenting must, in the present state of the law, 
be declined. 
Id. 
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101.”313  For the court, “substitution of specific values” was 
inadequate to “convert disembodied ideas . . . into an embodiment 
of those ideas, or into an application of the formula.”314 
The CCPA affirmed a rejection by the Board of Appeals under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims directed to a “computer-implemented 
model of a sales organization” in In re Maucorps.315  Applying 
Freeman’s two-step method of determining (1) “whether the claim 
directly or indirectly recites an ‘algorithm’ in the Benson sense of 
that term” and (2) “whether [the claim] in its entirety . . . wholly 
preempts that algorithm,”316 the court held that the “claimed 
invention as a whole comprises each and every means for carrying 
out a solution technique for a set of equations wherein one number 
is computed from a set of numbers.”317 Therefore, “appellant’s 
claims wholly preempt the recited algorithms.”318  Whether the 
claim was directed to a method or an apparatus was considered 
immaterial by the court.319 
On the other hand, in In re Sherwood,320 the C.C.PA. reversed 
a rejection by the Board of Appeals of another application directed 
to “geophysical prospecting.”321  What the board viewed as 
“mathematically converting one set of numbers into a new set of 
numbers,”322 the court found to be conversion of “physical 
apparitions, or particular patterns of magnetization on magnetic 
tape, i.e., the pattern of magnetization being a physical 
manifestation, or a physical line on a paper chart”323 from 
“amplitude-versus-time” seismic traces to “amplitude-versus-
 
 313 Id. at 1335. 
 314 Id. 
 315 In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 316 Id. at 485 n.2 (quoting In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
 317 Id. at 486. 
 318 Id. 
 319 See id. at 485 (“Labels are not determinative in § 101 inquiries.  ‘Benson applies 
equally whether an invention is claimed as an apparatus or process, because the form of 
the claim is often an exercise in drafting.’”) (quoting In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077 
(C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
 320 In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
 321 Id. at 811. 
 322 Id. at 818. 
 323 Id. at 819 (emphasis added). 
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depth” traces.324  The court held that the claimed system converted 
“one physical thing into another physical thing just as any other 
electrical circuitry would do,”325 and, therefore, more than “mere 
methods (or means) for solving mathematical equations.”326 
In re Walter327 was another case where the CCPA addressed 
the patentability of “seismic prospecting and surveying.”328  Judge 
Rich incorporated “scientific truth,” or “principle,” into the second 
step of the Freeman test, which hinged on preemption of a 
“mathematical algorithm” identified within claimed subject matter, 
thereby redefining that test in a manner that embraced both 
apparatus and process claims: 
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the 
claim as a whole must be further analyzed.  If it 
appears that the mathematical algorithm is 
implemented in a specific manner to define 
structural relationships between the physical 
elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to 
refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the 
claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes 
muster under § 101.329 
The redefined second step of the Freeman test was contrasted 
with “post-solution activity” or recitation of “field of use,” which 
presumably would not limit apparatus or process elements by the 
manner in which a “mathematical algorithm” is implemented: 
If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely 
presented and solved by the claimed invention, as 
was the case in Benson and Flook, and is not 
applied in any manner to physical elements or 
process steps, no amount of post-solution activity 
will render the claim statutory; nor is it saved by a 
 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. 
 327 In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
 328 Id. at 760. 
 329 Id. at 767. 
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preamble merely reciting the field of use of the 
mathematical algorithm.330 
Consistent with Judge Rich’s earlier pronouncements, a correct 
determination of statutory subject matter employing algorithms, 
mathematical formulas or scientific truth was not contingent on 
whether the subject matter, as claimed, was drafted as a process or 
apparatus, but rather it hinged on whether the claimed subject 
matter resulted in more than solution of a mathematical algorithm. 
In a landmark decision by the Supreme Court, Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty,331 the Court appeared to blend qualification as 
statutory subject matter with the other statutory requirements of 
novelty and utility.  There, a “live, human-made micro-
organism”332 was held to be patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter”333 
under the terms of that statute.334  The Court explicitly rejected the 
argument that the 1930 Plant Patent Act335 and the 1970 Plant 
Variety Protection Act336 excluded protection for human-made 
microorganisms under 35 U.S.C. § 101.337  The Court also refuted 
the notion that qualification of micro-organisms as patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would require express 
authorization from Congress.338  Neither was the Court swayed by 
the “gruesome parade of horribles” presented as a potential 
consequence of providing patent protection to man-made living 
organisms.339  Instead, the Court construed the 1952 Patent Act 
broadly, because “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent 
laws would be given wide scope,”340 in order to advance 
“Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal 
 
 330 Id. (emphasis added). 
 331 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 332 Id. at 305. 
 333 See id. at 312. 
 334 See id. at 318.   
 335 Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245. 46 Stat. 376 (repealed 1952). 
 336 Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (current 
version at 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2006)). 
 337 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311. 
 338 Id. at 315 (“Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not 
contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se.”). 
 339 Id. at 316. 
 340 Id. at 308. 
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encouragement.’”341  The Court invoked the legislative history of 
the 1952 Patent Act and P.J. Federico’s testimony: “[U]nder 
section 101 a person may have invented a machine or a 
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”342 
The Court went further, however, and appeared, at least, to 
blend qualification as statutory subject matter with other statutory 
requirements, namely, the novelty and utility requirements, which 
are separate from classification as a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
Specifically, the Court stated that “[h]is claim is not to a hitherto 
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human 
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”343  
Funk Bros. was distinguished on the basis of “markedly different 
characteristics” of Chakrabarty’s micro-organism from that 
occurring in nature, further reinforcing the idea of patent eligibility 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a function of novelty: 
Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature and one having potential 
for significant utility.  His discovery is not nature’s 
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable 
subject matter under § 101.344 
Next, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr345 addressed 
qualification under § 101 and seemed to import an enablement 
requirement into the section 101 inquiry.  The patent at issue was 
directed at a method for operating a rubber-molding press that 
included repetitively calculating the cure time and opening the 
press at the time indicated by those calculations.346  The Court 
 
 341 Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76 (H. A. 
Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854)). 
 342 Id. at 309 n.6 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951)). 
 343 Id. at 309–10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
 344 Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
 345 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 346 See id. at 178. 
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upheld a decision by the CCPA to reverse the rejection by the 
USPTO because “we do not view respondent’s claims as an 
attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to 
an industrial process for the molding of rubber products.”347   
The Court believed that it was being consistent with its earlier 
holding in Flook, where calculation of an alarm limit during an 
unspecified chemical reaction was held not to be patentable subject 
matter, despite the fact that, as in the instant case, the claims in 
Flook did not “cover every conceivable application of the 
formula.”348  The distinction, according to the Court, was whether 
the claim relied on “insignificant post-solution activity . . . [to] 
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”349  
The court further stated: “Similarly, a mathematical formula does 
not become patentable subject matter merely by including in the 
claim for the formula token post-solution activity such as the type 
claimed in Flook.”350  The Court did not provide much guidance in 
distinguishing between Flook’s “insignificant post-solution 
activity” and Diehr’s “industrial process” other than to point out 
that the claims at issue in Flook were not supported by an enabling 
written description, which is not a requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
but rather the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.351  In particular, 
the court stated that: 
We were careful to note in Flook that the patent 
application did not purport to explain how the 
variables used in the formula were to be selected, 
nor did the application contain any disclosure 
relating to chemical processes at work or the means 
 
 347 Id. at 192–93. 
 348 Id. at 193 n.14; see supra text accompanying notes 297–309. 
 349 Id. at 191–92. 
 350 Id. at 193 n.14. 
 351 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
C04_PIERCE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  2:08 PM 
2012] THE RISE AND FALL OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY 243 
of setting off an alarm or adjusting the alarm unit.  
All the application provided was a “formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit.”352 
Therefore, like the Flook Court, the reasoning provided by the 
Court in Diehr is subject to the same type of criticism that was 
made by the dissent in Flook, namely that, by basing qualification 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 on the presence or absence of “insignificant 
post-solution activity,” the Court is delivering a “damaging blow at 
basic principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 
35 U.S.C. § 101” other statutory requirements.353  In Flook, it was 
novelty and obviousness.354  In Diehr, it was enablement.  In 
addition, the Court in Diehr did not reduce the criteria for 
qualification under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to any general test, but instead 
relied upon simply considering the claimed subject matter “as a 
whole,” and reciting an example of a test that had been employed 
in the past, namely, that of “[t]ransforming and reduction of an 
article to a ‘different state or thing.’”355 
The dissent in Diehr stated that the majority had failed to 
“recognize the critical difference between the ‘discovery’ 
requirement in § 101 and the ‘novelty’ requirement in § 102,”356 
but, in making the distinction, the dissent actually appears to have 
made the same error, despite stating the contrary.357  Justice 
Stevens, for the dissent, stated that with respect to the claimed 
inventions of Flook and Diehr, the “post-solution activity is a 
significant part of the industrial process,”358 but that “in neither 
case should that activity have any legal significance because it 
 
 352 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 n.14. 
 353 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 354 See id.  Justice Stewart further stated that: 
It may well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent 
should issue on the process claimed in this case, because of 
anticipation, abandonment, obviousness, or for some other reason.  
But in my view the claimed process clearly meets the standards of 
subject matter patentability of § 101.  
Id. 
 355 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). 
 356 Id. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 357 See id. at 213 (“In the § 101 analysis, we must assume that the sequence of steps in 
this programming method is novel, unobvious and useful.”).   
 358 Id. at 215. 
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does not constitute a part of the inventive concept that the 
applicants claimed to have discovered.”359  The dissent’s analysis 
excluded what it believed to be non-statutory subject matter—
namely, the computer program360—and looked to the remainder of 
the steps to decide the “threshold question of whether such a 
method is patentable subject matter.”361  The dissent’s analysis of 
Diehr’s claimed method was squarely within the realm of 35 
U.S.C. § 102: 
Even the Court does not suggest that the computer 
program developed by Diehr and Lutton is a 
patentable discovery.  Accordingly, if we treat the 
program as though it were a familiar part of the 
prior art—as well-established precedent requires—
it is absolutely clear that their application contains 
no claim of patentable invention.  Their application 
was therefore properly rejected under § 101 by the 
Patent Office and the Board of Appeals.362 
Therefore, both the majority and the dissent in Diehr appear to 
have confused qualifications of subject matter as “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof,” with other requirements 
under the Patent Act of 1952.  The majority confused the question 
of statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with the 
“enablement” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, while the dissent, in 
criticizing the majority, also blended the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 with the novelty requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
Subsequent cases at the CCPA and, later, at the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, continued to decide qualification 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by breaking claims down into their 
component parts and evaluating the nature of individual steps or 
components of claimed subject matter.  Often, as in Flook and 
Diehr, analyses by courts hinged on issues provided for in other 
 
 359 Id. (emphasis added). 
 360 See id. at 216 (“In Parker v. Flook, we further held that such a computer program 
could not be transformed into a patentable process by the addition of postsolution activity 
that was not claimed to be novel.”). 
 361 Id. at 213. 
 362 Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
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sections of the Patent Act, such as whether “post-solution” activity 
was insignificant, which would be better addressed under 35 
U.S.C. § 103 as an issue of obviousness, and whether claimed 
subject matter was a “scientific truth” or “algorithm,” which is 
properly an issue of novelty.  Further, there appeared to be no 
consistency from case to case as to whether any particular 
application of a law of nature, physical phenomena or abstract idea 
was sufficiently distinct from a prohibited preemption of all 
applications of principle. 
For example, the CCPA in In re Abele363 affirmed a rejection 
by the USPTO of an independent claim directed to an 
“improvement in CAT scan imaging technique”364 as “no more 
than the calculation of a number and display of the result, albeit in 
a particular format,”365 while also upholding a dependent claim 
limiting the display of data to “X-ray attenuation data produced in 
a two dimensional field by a computed tomography scanner.”366  
The “X-ray attenuation data” was viewed by the court as “an 
application of an algorithm to process steps which are themselves 
part of an overall process which is statutory.”367  The court came to 
the conclusion that the dependent claim was statutory by carving 
out the algorithm and assessing the remaining components of the 
claim.368 
The court viewed Walter as requiring 
no more than that the algorithm be “applied in any 
manner to physical elements or process steps,” 
provided that its application is circumscribed by 
more than a field of use limitation or non-essential 
post-solution activity. . . . This broad reading of 
 
 363 In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 364 Id. at 904. 
 365 Id. at 909. 
 366 Id. at 908. 
 367 Id. at 908–09. 
 368 Id. at 908 (“Were we to view the claim absent the algorithm, the production, 
detection and display steps would still be present and would result in a conventional 
CAT-scan process.”). 
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Walter, we conclude, is in accord with the Supreme 
Court decisions.369 
A direct comparison was made between the permissible 
dependent claim and the rubber-curing process claimed in Diehr, 
and the court found that “[t]he improvement in either case resides 
in the application of a mathematical formula within the context of 
a process which encompasses significantly more than the algorithm 
alone.”370 
The two-dimensional presentation of X-ray attenuation data 
was enough of a physical application to distinguish it as patentable 
subject matter—in contrast to the method by which that data was 
generated.  In other words, physical application of the principle 
represented by the algorithm resided in display of data generated 
by that algorithm. 
A method of diagnosis was held unpatentable in In re 
Grams,371 where the Federal Circuit upheld a rejection by the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of claims directed to a 
method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual as a 
non-statutory algorithm, stating that the “presence of a physical 
step in the claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the 
claim statutory.”372  As further stated by the Court: “In all 
instances, this critical question must be answered: ‘What did 
applicants invent?’ . . . Though that analysis can be difficult, it is 
facilitated somewhat if, as here, the only physical step involves 
merely gathering data for the algorithm.”373  The court quoted In re 
Sarkar: “If the steps of gathering and substituting values were 
alone sufficient, every mathematical equation, formula, or 
algorithm having any practical use would be per se subject to 
patenting as a process under § 101.”374 
 
 369 Id. at 907 (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
 370 Id. at 909. 
 371 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 372 Id. at 840. 
 373 Id. at 839. 
 374 Id. (quoting In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
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On the other hand, in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. 
Corazonix Corp.,375 which involved a method of diagnosis and 
associated apparatus employing electric cardiographic signals 
generated by a patient, Judge Newman, for the court, viewed 
“converting,” “applying,” “determining,” and “comparing” as 
“physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical 
signal into another” and, therefore, met the Freeman-Walter-Abele 
standard.376  Grams was considered distinct in that the subject 
claims in Arrhythmia were narrowly tailored to an 
“electrocardiograph analysis process,” whereas the claims in 
Grams “had application to ‘any complex system, whether it be 
electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or combinations 
thereof.’”377  The fact that the “physical process” of the claimed 
electrocardiographic method and apparatus only transformed “one 
physical, electrical signal into another”378 was sufficient to meet 
the requirements of section 101, despite the fact that the output of 
the apparatus and process was “simply a number.”379  The 
Arrhythmia court reasoned that “[t]he number obtained is not a 
mathematical abstraction; it is a measure in microvolts of a 
specified heart activity, an indicator of the risk of ventricular 
tachycardia.  That the product is numerical is not a criterion of 
whether the claim is directed to statutory subject matter.”380 
The claimed subject matter in In re Alappat381 was directed to 
an apparatus, specifically, a “rasterizer” for smoothing a waveform 
display in a digital oscilloscope.382  Judge Rich reversed a rejection 
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for lack of 
statutory subject matter under section 101,383 and held that the 
subject matter of the claimed apparatus, which was expressed in 
 
 375 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 376 See id. at 1059 (“The Freeman-Walter-Abele standard is met, for the steps of 
Simson’s claimed method comprise an otherwise statutory process whose mathematical 
procedures are applied to physical process steps.”). 
 377 Id. (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 840). 
 378 Id. 
 379 Id. at 1060. 
 380 Id. 
 381 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 382 Id. at 1544. 
 383 See id. at 1545. 
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terms of “means-plus-function,”384 met the statutory requirements 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it did not “‘wholly preempt’ the use of 
any apparatus employing the combination of mathematical 
calculations recited therein,”385 but rather was “limited to the use 
of a particularly claimed combination of elements performing the 
particularly claimed combination of calculations to transform, i.e., 
rasterize, digitized waveforms (data) into anti-aliased, pixel 
illumination data to produce a smooth waveform.”386  Thus, 
despite the fact that the claim “would read on a general purpose 
computer programmed to carry out the claimed invention,”387 
according to Judge Rich, “a computer, like a rasterizer, is 
apparatus not mathematics.”388  The test for preemption for the 
Alappat court was whether there was a “useful, concrete and 
tangible result.”389 
Judge Archer delivered an extended dissent in which he 
relayed an abbreviated history of the development of the section 
101 requirements.  Ultimately, however, Judge Archer concluded 
that the claimed rasterizer “is simply the mathematical conversion 
of data”390 that “is not even limited to the environment of an 
oscilloscope.”391  Judge Archer stated that the attempt by the 
majority to find physical application of a principle masked the true 
nature of the invention: “[A]s a whole, there is no ‘application’ 
apart from the mathematical operation that is asserted to be the 
invention or discovery.  What is going on here is a charade.”392  
Judge Archer stated, in short: “As the player piano playing new 
music is not the stuff of patent law, neither is the mathematics that 
is Alappat’s ‘rasterizer.’”393 
 
 384 Id. at 1542. 
 385 Id. at 1544. 
 386 Id. 
 387 Id. at 1545. 
 388 Id. 
 389 Id. at 1544 (“This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be 
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, 
concrete, and tangible result.”). 
 390 Id. at 1564 (Archer, J., dissenting). 
 391 Id.  
 392 Id. at 1563–64. 
 393 Id. at 1568.  Particularly striking, in view of his reasoning in Alappat, is the fact that 
the following year Judge Archer, in In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995), 
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C. Crashing the Palace 
1. State Street Bank and Beyond 
Shortly before retiring from the bench, Judge Rich decided to 
follow Alappat rather than the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.  In 
State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group,394 he 
reversed and remanded a summary judgment by the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts that held invalid a 
patent entitled “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke 
Financial Services Configuration” under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  As 
stated by Judge Rich, the claimed system “facilitates a structure 
whereby mutual funds (Spokes) pool their assets in an investment 
portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership . . . [which] provides the 
administrator of a mutual fund with the advantageous combination 
of economies of scale in administering investments coupled with 
the tax advantages of a partnership.”395  In holding that the patent 
claims were directed to statutory subject matter, Judge Rich 
cautioned against reading limitations into section 101, such as 
“mathematical algorithm”396 and “business method”397 exceptions 
where “the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did 
not intend such limitations.”398  He dismissed the test developed 
under Freeman-Walter-Abele as having “little, if any, applicability 
to determining the presence of statutory subject matter” following 
the decisions in Diehr and Chakrabarty.399  Instead, Judge Rich 
relied on Alappat, which distinguished a non-statutory 
“disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized 
as an ‘abstract idea,’”400 from a statutory “specific machine to 
 
issued an order vacating a decision by the Board rejecting computer-product claims 
because the Commissioner of the U.S.P.T.O. conceded “that computer programs 
embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” See id. at 
1584.  
 394 State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).  
 395 Id. at 1370. 
 396 Id. at 1372. 
 397 Id. 
 398 Id. at 1373. 
 399 See id. at 1374. 
 400 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
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produce a useful, concrete and tangible result.”401  For Judge Rich, 
the claimed system of managing mutual funds fell squarely within 
the latter category: 
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, 
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine 
through a series of mathematical calculations into a 
final share price, constitutes a practical application 
of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or 
calculation, because it produces “a useful, concrete 
and tangible result”—a final share price 
momentarily fixed for recording and reporting 
purposes and even accepted and relied upon by 
regulatory authorities in subsequent trades.402 
Exclusion from section 101 as a “business method” exception 
also was dismissed by Judge Rich as having “never been invoked 
by this court, or the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable.”403 
As he had stated in several previous decisions, Judge Rich 
believed that enumeration of subject matter of a claim under any 
particular category within section 101 was not of great 
significance, “as long as it falls within at least one of the four 
enumerated categories of patentable subject matter.”404  For Judge 
Rich, then, “[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are 
identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting 
disembodied concepts or truths that are not ‘useful.’  From a 
practical standpoint, this means that to be patentable an algorithm 
must be applied in a ‘useful’ way.”405 
Judge Rich did not explain, however, how the “final share of 
price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes” 
constituted “concrete,” “tangible” or “useful” results, nor did he 
provide any limitation on patentable subject matter other than the 
broad categories listed in section 101.  Under Judge Rich’s 
interpretation, which essentially disregards all judicial 
 
 401 See id.  
 402 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544). 
 403 Id. at 1375. 
 404 Id. at 1372. 
 405 Id. at 1373. 
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interpretation of statutes governing the scope of statutory subject 
matter since the Patent Act of 1793 other than the prohibition 
against grant of exclusive rights to naturally occurring principles 
per se, the breadth of potentially patentable subject matter is 
almost boundless.  For example, without being tethered by some 
physical application of naturally occurring principle, to grant 
exclusive rights to “anything under the sun that is made by man”406 
explodes all previous categorizations—such as printed matter, 
mental steps, or anything else that might be viewed as man’s 
handiwork—so long as it could be considered “useful” in some 
sense.407  Examples of such areas might well include not only so-
called “methods of doing business,” but other fields not previously 
viewed as within the scope of patent protection: forms of 
government, religion, morality, ethics, art, and so on.  In sum, any 
form of human expression or control could be classified as a 
machine or process under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  After State Street 
Bank, decisions regarding the scope of statutory eligibility became 
more frequent and increasingly erratic. 
Justice Breyer, for example, along with Justices Stevens and 
Souter, in dissent from dismissal of a writ of certiorari of an appeal 
from the Federal Circuit in Laboratory Corp. of America v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,408 stated that a claimed method for 
detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded 
animals fell outside of § 101 because, by requiring that one 
practicing a method need only “(1) obtain test results and (2) think 
about them,”409 the claim constituted an “improper effort to obtain 
patent protection for a law of nature.”410  Justice Breyer did not 
consider the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test of State 
Street to be controlling, both because it had never been invoked by 
the Supreme Court and because “if taken literally, the statement 
 
 406 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 n.6 (1981) (quoting Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951)). 
 407 See supra text accompanying note 73–83 (regarding notions of “usefulness” as 
understood at the time the Constitution was written). 
 408 Lab. Corp. of America v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
 409 Id. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 410 Id. at 131. 
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would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary,”411 
such as the “use of electromagnetic current for transmitting 
messages over long distances” in Morse,412 “triggering alarm limits 
in connection with catalytic conversion” in Flook,413 and 
transforming, “for computer-programming purposes, decimal 
figures into binary figures” in Gottschalk v. Benson,414 despite 
their apparent utility.415 
The Federal Circuit in In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten416 held that 
a claim to a “signal” for embedding “watermarks” into electronic 
files such as digital audio files was not statutory subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it did not fall within any of the four 
enumerated statutory categories listed—i.e., “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter.”417  In essence, the court 
held that signals are not “an act or series of acts” and, therefore, 
not a “process”418 and not a “composition of matter” because a 
“signal [comprises] a fluctuation in electrical potential or in 
electromagnetic fields” and, therefore, “is not a ‘chemical union’ 
nor a gas, fluid, powder, or solid.”419  Further, although signals are 
physical, they are “transitory embodiments”420 and, consequently, 
not a “machine”421 or a “manufacture”422 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
 411 Id. at 136. 
 412 See supra text accompanying notes 203–19. 
 413 See supra text accompanying notes 297–308. 
 414 See supra text accompanying notes 284–92. 
 415 See Lab Corp., 548 U.S. at 136–37. 
 416 In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 417 See id. at 1357. 
 418 See id. at 1355  
 419 See id. at 1357. 
 420 See id. at 1353. 
 421 See id. at 1355. 
The Supreme Court has defined the term ‘machine’ as a ‘concrete 
thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of 
devices.’ Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863). . . . A 
transitory signal made of electrical or electromagnetic variances is 
not made of ‘parts’ or ‘devices’ in any mechanical sense.  While such 
a signal is physical and real, it does not possess concrete structure in 
the sense implied by these definitions. 
Id. 
 422 See id. at 1356 (“These definitions address ‘articles’ of ‘manufacture’ as being 
tangible articles or commodities.  A transient electric or electromagnetic transmission 
does not fit within that definition.”). 
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Acting en banc in In re Comisky,423 the Federal Circuit held as 
ineligible for patent protection claims directed to a method and 
system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents if they 
“depend entirely on the use of mental processes.”424  The court 
reasoned that “it is established that the application of human 
intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of 
itself patentable.”425  Claims that recited “under the broadest 
reasonable interpretation . . . use of a machine”—such as a 
“registration module,” “arbitration module,” an “arbitration 
resolution module,” or access to “the Internet, intranet, World 
Wide Web, software applications, telephone, television, cable 
video [or radio], magnetic, electronic communication, or other 
communication means”—were remanded to the Patent Office for 
consideration under 35 U.S.C. § 101.426 
The Federal Circuit in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Services (Prometheus I)427 upheld as statutory 
subject matter methods of optimizing “therapeutic efficacy for 
treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”428  At 
issue in Prometheus were claimed diagnostic tests for determining 
whether subsequent administration of either of two drugs—
namely, 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP) or a prodrug for 6-MP, 
azathiopurine—employed to treat inflammatory bowel diseases 
such as Crohn’s Disease and ulcerative colitis should be increased 
or decreased.429  Independent claims included the method steps of 
administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, followed by 
determining the level of 6-thioguanine or 6-MP, both of which 
were metabolites of the therapeutic drugs, to determine if 
subsequent doses of those drugs should be increased or 
decreased.430  One independent claim included only the step of 
 
 423 In re Comisky, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 424 See id. at 980.   
 425 Id. 
 426 See id. at 981. 
 427 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs.(Prometheus I) 581 F.3d 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).  
 428 Id. at 1340. 
 429 See id. at 1339. 
 430 See id. 
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determining the level of metabolites in a subject to which the drug 
had been administered.431  Since the drugs and their utility were 
known, the claimed novelty lay in the criteria provided in the claim 
for determining whether subsequent doses should be increased or 
decreased.432 
Referring to its own decision in Bilski,433 as well as the 
Supreme Court decision in Diehr, the Federal Circuit in 
Prometheus I stated on appeal: 
[I]t has . . . been established that “while a claim 
drawn to a fundamental principle”—i.e., a law of 
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea—“is 
unpatentable, ‘an application of law or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or 
process may well be deserving of patent 
prosecution.’”434 
The Court further stated that the “key issue for patentability, 
then, at least on the present facts, is whether a claim is drawn to a 
fundamental principle or an application of a fundamental 
principle.”435  The “machine-or-transformation” test articulated in 
Bilski “must be central to the purpose of the claimed process”436 as 
opposed to “insignificant extra-solution activity” or a “data-
gathering step.”437 
The court found transformation to inhere in the administration 
of the drugs to the patient according to the method of the claim438 
and, independently, in the “determining step.”439  According to the 
court, “[s]ome form of manipulation, such as the high pressure 
liquid chromatography method specified in several of the asserted 
 
 431 See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col.23 l.41 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); see also Prometheus 
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 F.3d 1347, 1350–51 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 432 See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1340. 
 433 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010). 
 434 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953). 
 435 Id. 
 436 Id. at 1342–43 (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–62). 
 437 Id. (quoting Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–63). 
 438 See id. at 1346. 
 439 Id. at 1347. 
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dependent claims or other modification of the substances to be 
measured, is necessary to extract the metabolites from a bodily 
sample and determine their concentration.”440  The administration 
and determination step was found to be “central to the claims 
rather than merely insignificant extra-solution activity.”441 
The court distinguished Prometheus’ claimed therapeutic 
methods from those at issue in In re Grams442 on the basis that the 
clinical tests conducted in Grams were not “transformative.”443  
According to the Court in Prometheus I, Grams held unpatentable 
claims that included “(1) performing a clinical test on individuals 
and (2) based on the data from that test, determining if an 
abnormality existed and determining possible causes of any 
abnormality by using an algorithm.”444  The Grams process “was 
merely an algorithm combined with a data gathering step.”445  The 
Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the final step in 
each of Prometheus’ claimed methods were mental steps and “thus 
not patent eligible per se,”446 but stated that the “addition of the 
mental steps to the claimed methods does not remove the prior two 
steps” from the realm of statutory subject matter.447  Applying the 
question posed by the Grams court—“what did the applicant 
invent?”448—to the facts in Prometheus I, the Federal Circuit stated 
that “the answer is a series of transformative steps that optimizes 
efficacy and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for 
particular diseases using particular drugs.”449  The court was 
careful to assert, however, that “it is improper to consider whether 
 
 440 Id. 
 441 Id. (“Mayo is correct that not all of the asserted claims contain the administering 
step.  That omission, which occurs in claims 46 and 53 of the ’623 patent, does not 
diminish the patentability of the claimed methods because the determining step, which is 
present in each of the asserted claims is also transformative and central to the claimed 
methods.”). 
 442 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 
371–74. 
 443 See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1347. 
 444 Id. at 1348. 
 445 Id. (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 840). 
 446 See id. 
 447 See id. 
 448 Id. at 1349 (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 839). 
 449 Id. at 1349. 
C04_PIERCE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  2:08 PM 
256 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:186 
a claimed element or step in a process is novel or non-obvious, 
since such considerations are separate requirements set forth in 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, respectively.”450 
2. Bilski  v. Kappos: “Restoring . . . [an] . . . Historical State 
of Rest”451 
In Bilski  v. Kappos,452 the Supreme Court upheld decisions of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office453 and United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit454 that the claimed 
subject matter of U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, entitled 
“Energy Risk Management Method,” filed April 10, 1997, was not 
eligible for protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.455  The application 
included eleven claims directed to a “method for managing the 
consumption of risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity 
provider at a fixed price.”456 
 
 450 Id. at 1343. 
 451 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
opinion for the Court explains—correctly—that the Court is merely restoring the law to 
its historical state of rest.”) (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227).  
 452 Id. at 3218. 
 453 Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 454 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 455 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3213, 3231 (2010).  
 456 Claim 1 is representative and reads:   
1.  A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a 
commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising 
the steps of: 
 (a)initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers 
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical 
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said 
consumer; 
 (b)identifying market participants for said commodity having a 
counter-risk position to said consumers; and  
 (c)initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that 
said series of market participant transactions balances the risk 
position of said series of consumer transactions. 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010 ) (No. 08-
964).  Claim 4, the only other independent claim, applied the same concept more 
specifically to a “method for managing weather related energy price risk costs by an 
energy provider at a fixed price,” and applies a specific mathematic formula. See id. at 7–
8. 
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The questions presented on appeal to the Supreme Court were: 
(1) “[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a ‘process’ 
must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a 
particular article into a different state or thing (‘machine-or-
transformation’ test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 
101;” and (2) “[w]hether the Federal Circuit’s ‘machine-or-
transformation’ test for patent eligibility . . . contradicts the clear 
Congressional intent that patents protect ‘method[s] of doing or 
conducting business.’”457 
With respect to the first question, the Court held that the 
Federal Circuit did err by holding that a “process” must be tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article 
into a different state or thing to be eligible for patenting under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.458  Without directly answering the second question 
presented on appeal, the Court further stated that, “[i]n the course 
of applying a machine-or-transformation test to emerging 
technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy and 
refinement that they risk obscuring the larger object of securing 
patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public 
domain.”459  Moreover, the Court did not preclude application of 
the machine-or-transformation test to any statutory category of 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but did state that articulation 
in 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) of a “method of doing or conducting 
 
 457 The complete questions as they appear in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari are as 
follows: 
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must 
be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular 
article into a different state or thing (“machine-or-transformation” 
test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, despite this 
Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad statutory grant of 
patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process beyond excluding 
patents for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 
 Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test 
for patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent 
protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear 
Congressional intent that patents protect “method(s) of doing or 
conducting business.” 
Id. at i (citing 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006)). 
 458 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (“The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test 
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”). 
 459 Id.  
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business,”460 means that, “at least in some circumstances,”461 
business methods are eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
although “it does not suggest broad patentability of such claimed 
inventions.”462 
Relying on the Supreme Court precedent463 excepting “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”464 from patent 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Court held that the “concept 
of hedging described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical 
formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea”465 and, 
therefore, ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.466  According to the 
Court, “[a]llowing petitioner to patent risk hedging would pre-
empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant 
a monopoly over an abstract idea.”467  Having excluded the Federal 
Circuit’s use of the “machine-or-transformation” test as the sole 
criteria for patent eligibility, the Court nevertheless was  careful to 
state that “nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing 
interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has used in the past,”468 and that the Court “by no means 
foreclose[s] the Federal Circuit’s development of other limiting 
criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not 
inconsistent with its text.”469 
Justice Stevens, in his last opinion before retiring from the 
bench, concurred in the result, but was sharply critical of the 
reasoning employed by the majority.  For him, the Court’s opinion 
was “less than pellucid in more than one respect, and, if 
misunderstood, could result in confusion or upset settled areas of 
the law.”470  Specifically, Justice Stevens disagreed with the 
 
 460 See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘method’ means a method of doing or 
conducting business.”). 
 461 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228. 
 462 Id. at 3229. 
 463 See id. 
 464 Id. at 3225. 
 465 Id. at 3231. 
 466 See id. (“In light of these precedents, it is clear that petitioner’s application is not a 
patentable ‘process.’”). 
 467 Id.  
 468 Id.  
 469 Id.  
 470 See id. at 3234 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Court’s reliance on 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) for a definition of 
“process,”471 which he characterized as “somewhat circular.”472  A 
logical consequence of the Court’s reliance on the statutory 
definition, in Justice Stevens’ thinking, would be to consider 
patentable “any series of steps or any way to do any thing,” which 
the 1952 Patent Act was “neither intended nor understood to 
encompass.”473  Prohibiting abstract ideas, laws of nature “and the 
like,”474 was not, for Justice Stevens, an adequate bulwark against 
many processes that would be eligible for patent prosecution, such 
as a “process for training a dog, a series of dance steps, a method 
of shooting a basketball, maybe even words, stories or songs, 
framed as the steps of typing letters or uttering sounds.”475 
Justice Stevens further criticized the majority for imputing 
from the definition of process that the American Inventors 
Protection Act “acknowledges that there may be business method 
patents.”476  Rather, Stevens asserted that the “1999 Act was 
passed to limit the impact of the Federal Circuit’s then-recent 
statements on the 1952 Act,”477 referring to Judge Rich’s 
comments, in dicta, in State Street Bank.478  The paradoxical effect 
of the majority’s reasoning, according to Stevens, is that, “[i]f, 
tomorrow, Congress were to conclude that patents on business 
methods are so important that the special infringement defense in § 
273 ought to be abolished . . . [this would] strengthen the case 
against such patents because there would no longer be a § 273 that 
‘acknowledges . . . business method patents.’”479  With respect to 
the “sole issue presented to us,”480 Justice Stevens stated that, in 
 
 471 See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (“When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates . 
. . [t]he term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacturer, composition of matter, or material”). 
 472 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3237 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 473 Id. 
 474 Id. at 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 475 Id. at 3238. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 476 Id. at 3251 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion). 
 477 Id.  
 478 State St. Bank & Trust Co., v. Signature Fin. Grp. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“The business method exception has never been invoked by this court, or the 
C.C.P.A., to deem an invention unpatentable.”). 
 479 Bilski, 130 S. Ct at 3252 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 480 Id. at 3235. 
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striking down the machine-or-transformation test as the sole 
criterion for patent eligibility, “the Court is merely restoring the 
law to its historical state of rest,”481 and “that the machine-or-
transformation test remains an important test for patentability.”482 
Justice Stevens also was critical of the Court’s failure to 
provide “a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable 
abstract idea”483 and, as a consequence, despite a “correct 
outcome,”484 concluded that the “court’s musings on this issue 
stand for very little.”485  He stated that, in view of the history of the 
development of British and American patent law, and the 
“constitutionally mandated purpose and function of the patent 
laws,”486 despite the fact that business methods might be “useful 
for encouraging innovation and disclosure, it would still be 
questionable whether they would, on balance, facilitate or impede 
the progress of American business.”487  Acknowledging that 
methods of doing business are ineligible for patent protection 
under section 101 would, according to Justice Stevens, “be a far 
more sensible and restrained way to resolve”488 the issues 
presented in Bilski.  Justice Stevens concluded by stating that, 
“while I confirm the judgment, I strongly disagree with the court’s 
disposition of this case.”489  Justices Breyer and Scalia concurred 
with Justice Stevens’ opinion “in full” in a separate opinion.490 
3. The “Historical State of Rest” Since Bilski 
Cases decided since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski 
seem minimally affected by the outcome in Bilski.  The first such 
case, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
 
 481 Id.. 
 482 Id. 
 483 Id. at 3236 
 484 Id 
 485 See id. 
 486 Id. at 3252. 
 487 Id. at 3255. 
 488 Id. at 3257. 
 489 Id. 
 490 Id. at 3257–58 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This Court has never before held that so-
called ‘business methods’ are patentable, and, in my view, the test, history, and purpose 
of the Patent Act make clear that they are not.  I would therefore decide this case on that 
ground, and I join Justice Stevens’ opinion in full.”). 
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Services (Prometheus II),491 was decided by the Federal Circuit on 
remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light of 
Bilski.  As discussed above,492 prior to remand, the Federal Circuit 
in Prometheus I had applied the “machine-or-transformation test,” 
which was considered at the time to be the “definitive test”493 for 
determining whether a process is patentable subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. § 101, and held that both the “administering”494 and 
“determining”495 steps in the claimed diagnostic method of 
Prometheus were transformative.  As a consequence, the Federal 
Circuit reversed496 the district court’s decision, which held the 
claims to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as wholly preempting 
use of the “natural phenomena” of “correlations between, on the 
one hand, thiopurine drug metabolite levels and, on the other hand, 
efficacy and toxicity.”497 
On remand, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus II acknowledged 
the Supreme Court’s refusal in Bilski to adopt the “machine-or-
transformation test” as the sole test for determining patent 
eligibility and quoted the Court’s assertion that “while a law of 
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea cannot be patented, 
‘an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a 
 
 491 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 492 See supra text accompanying notes 433–50.  
 493 See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 
(2010).  The court stated: 
The key issue for patentability, then, at least on the present facts, is 
whether a claim is drawn to a fundamental principle or an application 
of a fundamental principle.  Although this inquiring is hardly 
straightforward, following the Supreme Court, we articulated in 
Bilski a “definitive test” for determining whether a process is patent-
eligible under § 101: “A claimed process is surely patent eligible 
under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” 
Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 494 See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 
(1972)) (“The administering step, therefore, is not merely data-gathering but a significant 
transformative element of Prometheus’s claimed methods of treatment that is ‘sufficiently 
definite to confine the patent monopoly.’”).  
 495 See id. at 1347 (“The determining step, by working a chemical and physical 
transformation on physical substances, likewise sufficiently confines the patent 
monopoly, as required by Bilski.”). 
 496 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1350. 
 497 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1341. 
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known structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection.’”498  The Federal Circuit also highlighted the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Diehr that it is “inappropriate to dissect the 
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence 
of the old elements in the analysis,”499 while concluding that 
“[n]onetheless, a scientific principle cannot be made patentable by 
limiting its use to a particular technological environment or by 
adding insignificant post-solution activity.”500 
Applying these principles to the claimed methods of 
“optimizing therapeutic efficacy,” the court stated that 
“Prometheus’ asserted method claims recite a patent-eligible 
application of naturally occurring correlations between metabolite 
levels and efficacy or toxicity,”501 because “the steps involve a 
particular application of the natural correlations: the treatment of a 
specific disease by administering specific drugs and measuring 
specific metabolites.”502  According to the court, “[t]he inventive 
nature of the claimed methods stems not from preemption of all 
use of these natural processes, but from the application of a natural 
phenomenon in a series of steps comprising particular methods of 
treatment.”503  Again applying the machine-or-transformation test, 
the court stated that the “asserted claims are in effect claims to 
methods of treatment, which are always transformative when one 
of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to eliminate 
the effects of an undesired condition.”504  The court then found that 
both the administering and determining steps included 
transformations, specifically metabolization of the administered 
drugs after administration and “manipulation, such as the high 
pressure liquid chromatography method specified in several of the 
asserted dependent claims or some other modification of the 
substances to be measured,”505 that were required to determine 
 
 498 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 
(2010)).  
 499 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
 500 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1354. 
 501 Id. at 1355. 
 502 Id. 
 503 Id. 
 504 Id. at 1356. 
 505 Id. at 1357. 
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levels of the metabolites formed.  In both cases, according to the 
court, the transformations were “central to the purpose of the 
claims,”506 as prescribed by Bilski.  As before, the court contrasted 
the claimed subject matter with that of Grams in that the methods 
of Prometheus were more than “‘merely’ data-gathering steps” 
associated with “insignificant extra-solution activity.”507 
In other words, in order to find statutory subject matter in 
Prometheus’ claims, the court was forced to distinguish Grams’ 
“data-gathering steps” from Prometheus’ “purpose of treating 
disease” and “purpose of assessing the drug’s dosage during the 
course of treatment.”508  However, characterizing claimed subject 
matter as patent eligible or not on the basis of the purpose 
associated with the claimed invention reduces any such analysis to 
a matter of semantics; any act, such as collection of data, can 
arbitrarily be ascribed to a higher purpose. 
Viewed from the standpoint of physical application of 
naturally-occurring principle, on the other hand, the subject matter 
of both Prometheus and Grams would meet the statutory criteria of 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but neither might pass the 
requirement of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, regardless of 
whether the testing and determination steps could be held to be 
part of Prometheus’ “treatment protocol”509 or “merely an 
algorithm combined with a data-gathering step,” as ascribed to 
Grams.510  Diagnostic testing, such as was claimed as application 
of principle in both Prometheus511 and Grams,512 would have to 
include some physical application of principle in order to qualify 
as statutory subject matter, and that physical application would 
have to be new in order to meet the novelty requirement. 
More generally, diagnostic testing is based on some discovered 
correlation between a test result and a physiological condition, and 
the value of the test is in the ability to isolate a subpopulation 
 
 506 Id. 
 507 See id. at 1358. 
 508 Id. at 1357. 
 509 Id. 
 510 Id. at 1358. 
 511  See, e.g., Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 512  See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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likely to have the physiological condition identified by the claimed 
diagnostic method.  Diagnostic methods, therefore, quite clearly 
qualify as statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, 
further, will at least meet the statutory requirement of novelty if the 
claimed method includes a novel physical step.  For example, the 
claimed diagnostic testing in Metabolite, discussed above,513 
included a physical manifestation of naturally-occurring principle, 
namely, that of testing for an amount of total homocysteine.514  
The novelty associated with this claimed method was the selection 
of a subpopulation on whom the test was to be conducted.  The 
new application of the principle was testing of a subpopulation of 
individuals for whom elevated levels of total homocysteine could 
generally be correlated with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate, as 
discussed by the inventors.515  Conversely, the mere act of drawing 
new conclusions from available information would not represent a 
physical application of naturally-occurring principle, even if new, 
nor would new conclusions drawn from ubiquitous testing 
constitute a novel method, even if the testing done was, in fact, a 
physical application of naturally-occurring principle, as in Grams, 
or even Prometheus. 
The Federal Circuit took a comparatively broad view of 
statutory qualification of claimed subject matter in Research Corp. 
Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.516  The claims of the patent at 
issue were directed to methods and machines for imaging that 
utilized half-toning masks “designed to produce visually pleasing 
dot profiles when thresholded at a number of levels and a 
comparator responsive to [a] computer readable memory 
device.”517  The court reversed the district court’s holding that the 
claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and appeared to accept 
the Supreme Court’s invitation in Bilski to develop “other limiting 
criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not 
inconsistent with its text”518 to determine the eligibility of claimed 
 
 513  See supra text accompanying notes 408–15. 
 514  See Lab. Corp. of America v. Metabolite Labs., Inc 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 515  See id. at 128. 
 516 Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 517 Id. at 866. 
 518 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
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subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Considering the three 
exceptions to eligibility—laws of nature, physical phenomena and 
abstract principle—neither the inventors nor the court understood 
the claimed process or machine for half-tone imaging to preempt 
either laws of nature or physical phenomena.519   
As to whether the claimed subject matter amounted to nothing 
more than an abstract idea, the court stated that it would “not 
presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition that this 
disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to 
override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter 
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the 
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”520  The court 
viewed the claimed pixel-by-pixel comparison of a digital image 
against a blue noise mask of the invention to be “functional and 
palpable applications in the field of computer technology”521 that 
“are not likely to be so abstract that they would override the 
statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”522   
As in Prometheus II, where the court held that the claimed 
process was “not ‘merely’ data-gathering steps or ‘insignificant 
extra-solution activity,’ [but rather] part of treatment regimes for 
various diseases using thiopurine drugs,”523 the court relied on 
Diehr to resolve the issue of eligibility by selectively 
characterizing the claimed invention: “Borrowing from the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Diehr, this court observes that 
the patentees here ‘do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.  
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of’ halftoning in 
computer applications.”524  Correctly, the Federal Circuit also 
indicated that, despite qualifying under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the 
claimed subject matter might not meet the requirements of other 
 
 519 See Research Corp., 627 F.3d  at 869 (“Accordingly, this court reverses the district 
court’s summary judgment that the ’310 and ’228 patents do not claim patent-eligible 
inventions.”). 
 520 Id. at 868. 
 521 Id. 
 522 Id. at 869. 
 523 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 524 Research Corp., 627 F.3d  at 869 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 
(1981)). 
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sections of the patent statute.525  Here, the court stated that 
although a claimed process may “pass the coarse eligibility filter,” 
it might still be indefinite or lack an enabling description under 35 
U.S.C. § 112.526 
The central issue in all questions of patent eligibility is how to 
discern impermissible claims to laws of nature, physical 
phenomena and abstract ideas from eligible subject matter, since 
almost any claimed subject matter can be characterized as eligible 
or not, depending upon the limits of the context applied by the 
court.  For example, in Research Corp. Technologies, the claimed 
invention did nothing more than manipulate data to present an 
improved image, similar to the “rasterizer” for smoothing a wave 
form displayed on an oscilloscope in Alappat,527 and therefore 
appeared to reflect the “charade” complained of by Judge Archer 
in his dissenting opinion in that case.528  Despite the court’s 
acknowledgment that “[s]ection 101 does not permit a court to 
reject subject matter categorically because it finds that a claim is 
not worthy of a patent,”529 by linking “specific applications or 
improvements to technologies in the marketplace”530 to newly-
derived judicial tests, such as whether claims are “likely to be so 
abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of 
the Patent Act” (as was done by the court in Research Corp. 
Technologies),531 doctrinal analysis of patent eligibility is brought 
just that much closer to the dangers of unpredictability that attend 
broad contextual characterizations. 
In another example, the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
determination of invalidity of claims directed to a “method and 
system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between [a] 
consumer and a merchant over the Internet” in CyberSource Corp. 
v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,532 because “one could mentally perform 
 
 525 See id. 
 526 See id. 
 527 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 528 See id. at 1564 (Archer, J., dissenting). 
 529 Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868. 
 530 Id. at 869 (emphasis added). 
 531 Id. 
 532 See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
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the fraud detection method.”533  With respect to the “so-called 
‘Beauregard claim’” format of a “computer readable medium 
containing program instructions,” the court stated that 
CyberSource had not “met its burden to demonstrate that [the 
claim] is ‘truly drawn to a specific’ computer readable medium, 
rather than to the underlying method of credit card fraud 
detection.”534  The court did not elaborate on how CyberSource 
could establish that the claimed subject matter is “‘truly drawn to a 
specific’ computer readable medium,” other than to say that “mere 
manipulation or reorganization of dates . . . does not satisfy the 
transformation prong”535 and “merely claiming a software 
implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be 
performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy the 
machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”536 
Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s confirmation in Bilski that 
“an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a 
known structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection,”537 it becomes impossible for courts to identify which 
applications are not “made patentable by limiting its use to a 
particular technological environment or by adding insignificant 
post-solution activity,”538 as the Prometheus II court stated, and 
those that are “not so manifestly abstract as to override the 
statutory language of § 101” as in Research Corp. Technologies.539  
Moreover, if courts remain without a clear understanding of the 
types of principles historically embraced by the statutory 
applications of “art” or “process,” “machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof,” 
the “wide scope,” contemplated by Congress—and recited in 
 
 533 Id.  
 534 Id. at 1374–75 (emphasis added). 
 535 Id. at 1375. 
 536 Id. 
 537 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 187 (1981)). 
 538 Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1358, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–
92). 
 539 Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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Chakrabarty540—is likely to be tested by claims to subject matter 
that are unrelated to any naturally-occurring principle, such as 
purely human conceptions including financial systems, forms of 
government, religion and other systems that give “people 
power . . . (just) over the people.”541 
In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & 
Trademark Office,542 Judge Robert W. Sweet granted summary 
judgment invalidating fifteen claims of seven patents543—all 
directed to human breast cancer susceptibility genes 1 and 2 
(BRCA 1 and BRCA 2), fragments and mutated forms of those 
genes, and to methods for their identification and use.544  In 
essence, Judge Sweet held that isolated nucleic acids are 
unpatentable as products of nature, which are prohibited as outside 
the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.545 
On appeal,546 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court 
decision with respect to all of the claims directed to “isolated” 
DNA and all but one of the claims directed to methods of use of 
 
 540 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (“Congress plainly contemplated 
that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”).  
 541 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 542 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 543 See id. at 185–86. 
 544 See id. at 184–85. 
 545 See id. at 185.  The court stated: 
The resolution of these motions is based upon long recognized 
principles of molecular biology and genetics: DNA represents the 
physical embodiment of biological information, distinct in its 
essential characteristics from any other chemical found in nature.  It 
is concluded that DNA’s existence in an “isolated” form alters neither 
this fundamental quality of DNA as it exists in the body nor the 
information it encodes.  Therefore, the patents at issue directed to 
“isolated DNA” containing sequences found in nature are 
unsustainable as a matter of law and are deemed unpatentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 Similarly, because the claimed comparisons of DNA sequences 
are abstract mental processes, they also constitute unpatentable 
subject matter under § 101. 
Id. 
 546 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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DNA.547  With respect to the eligibility of isolated DNA 
molecules, the court dismissed a “magic microscope”548 test 
proposed by the defendant USPTO, stating that “because such a 
microscope could focus in on the claimed isolated BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 sequences as they exist in the human body, the claims 
covering those sequences are not patent eligible.”549  In contrast, 
because the same “imaginary microscope could not focus in vivo 
on a cDNA sequence, which is engineered by man to splice 
together non-contiguous coding sequences (i.e., exons), claims 
covering cDNAs are patent eligible.”550  For the Federal Circuit, 
both isolated DNAs and cDNAs are “markedly different—have a 
distinctive chemical identity and nature—from molecules that exist 
in nature,”551 as required by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty.552  
Like cDNAs, “human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a 
portion of a native chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated 
DNA a distinctive chemical identity from that possessed by native 
DNA.”553 
The court distinguished the “markedly different characteristics” 
of Chakrabarty from the “magic microscope” test by linking patent 
eligibility to “reducing a portion of nature to concrete form” which 
“may have an entirely different utility”: 
Because isolated DNAs, not just cDNAs, have a 
markedly different chemical structure compared to 
native DNAs, we reject the government’s proposed 
“magic microscope” test, as it misunderstands the 
 
 547 See id. at 1334. 
 548 Id. at 1350. 
 549 Id. 
 550 Id.  
 551 Id. at 1351. 
 552 See supra text accompanying notes 331–44. 
 553 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1352.  The court dismissed the analogy 
made by the district court between “isolation” and “purification.”  As stated by the court: 
[I]solated DNA is not purified DNA.  Purification makes pure what 
was the same material, but was previously impure.  Although isolated 
DNA must be removed from its native cellular and chromosomal 
environment, it has also been manipulated chemically so as to 
produce a molecule that is markedly different from that which exists 
in the body.   
Id. 
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difference between science and invention and fails 
to take into account the existence of molecules as 
separate chemical entities. . . . It is the difference 
between knowledge of nature and reducing a 
portion of nature to concrete form, the latter activity 
being what the patent laws seek to encourage and 
protect.  The government’s microscope could focus 
in on a claimed portion of any complex molecule, 
rendering that claimed portion patent ineligible, 
even though that portion never exists as a separate 
molecule in the body or anywhere else in nature, 
and may have an entirely different utility.  That 
would discourage innovation.554 
By using the word “may,” the court also partitioned patent 
eligibility from the statutory requirement that patentable subject 
matter must be useful.  In other words, the requirement of 
“markedly different characteristics” that must be possessed by 
patent eligible subject matter does not mandate that patent eligible 
subject matter, in fact, be useful, but rather, only that it has the 
potential to be useful in ways other than are possible by the form 
of that subject matter as it exists in nature. 
To make matters worse, the court in Molecular Pathology 
seemed to have failed to distinguish patentable from patent 
eligible subject matter.  Subject matter may be patent eligible and, 
at the same time, not be patentable, although it exhibits “markedly 
different characteristics relative to its native counterpart, because it 
may not, in fact, be “useful” under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Subject 
matter also may be patent eligible and yet not be patentable 
because it may not meet the requirement of non-obviousness under 
35 U.S.C. § 103.  The Molecular Pathology court, however, 
seemed to miss its own point by stating, in response to an analogy 
by the dissent to “snapping a leaf from a tree,”555 that “no one 
 
 554 Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). 
 555 Id. at 1377 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Judge Bryson 
stated: 
In that respect, extracting a gene is akin to snapping a leaf from a 
tree.  Like a gene, a leaf has a natural starting and stopping point.  It 
buds during spring from the same place that it breaks off and falls 
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could contemplate that snapping a leaf from a tree would be 
worthy of a patent, whereas isolating genes to provide useful 
diagnostic tools and medicines is surely what the patent laws are 
intended to encourage and protect.”556  Ignoring the fact that 
isolated leaves are clearly not novel, there is no reason to believe 
that those leaves may not have utilities entirely different than those 
available while they are still attached.  The same may be said for 
isolated chemical elements, diamonds and kidneys, which also 
were mentioned by the court as not necessarily being “sufficiently 
distinctive to make the composition markedly different from the 
one that exists in nature.”557  The court here confused patent 
eligibility with statutory utility by making patent eligibility at least 
potentially contingent upon a demonstration of distinct utility: 
[W]e cannot tell on this record whether the changes 
are sufficiently distinctive to make the composition 
markedly different from the one that exists in 
nature.  In contrast, a portion of a native DNA 
molecule—an isolated DNA—has a markedly 
different chemical nature from the native DNA.  It 
is, therefore, patentable subject matter.558 
Again, the proper issue is not whether the subject matter is 
“patentable,” but rather whether it is “patent eligible.” 
The method claims at issue in Molecular Pathology were 
divided by the majority into those directed to “comparing” or 
“analyzing” sequences,559 and those directed to “screening 
potential cancer therapeutics.”560  The court held that claims 
directed to “comparing” or “analyzing” gene sequences were not 
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 “because they claim only 
 
during autumn.  Yet prematurely plucking the leaf would not turn it 
into a human-made invention. 
Id. 
 556 Id. at 1354 (majority opinion). 
 557 Id. (“Elemental lithium is the same element whether it is in the earth or isolated; the 
diamond is the same lattice of carbon molecules, just with the earth removed; the kidney 
is the same kidney; the leaf the same leaf.”). 
 558 Id. (emphasis added). 
 559 Id. at 1355. 
 560 Id. at 1357. 
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abstract mental processes,”561 and refused to impute to the claims 
“transformative steps,” such as “extracting DNA from a human 
sample” or “sequencing the BRCA DNA molecule.”562  In contrast 
to Prometheus’ claimed methods, the court held that Myriad’s 
method claims did not include a “‘determining’ step [that] was 
both transformative and central to the purpose of the claims.”563  
Instead, the “comparison between the two sequences” of Myriad’s 
claims “can be accomplished by mere inspection alone.”564 
Myriad’s other method claims, directed to “screening potential 
cancer therapies,” were held, on the other hand, to be patent 
eligible because the claims included “the steps of (1) ‘growing’ 
host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the presence 
or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, (2) ‘determining’ the 
growth rate of the host cells with or without the potential 
therapeutic, and (3) ‘comparing’ the growth rate of the host 
cells.”565  All of these steps were considered to be “central to the 
purpose of the claimed process.”566  The court concluded that the 
screening methods of Myriad did not “cover all cells, all 
compounds, or all methods of determining the therapeutic effect of 
a compound,”567 and therefore were “not so ‘manifestly abstract’ 
as to claim only a scientific principle, and not a patent eligible 
process.”568 
As with the court’s earlier analysis, it is not clear why physical 
manipulation cannot be imputed to “comparing” or “analyzing” 
method steps, but can be considered inherent in the “determining” 
method steps of Prometheus and in the “screening” claims of 
Myriad.  Further, the court did not explain how to distinguish 
permissible narrow application of scientific principle from 
impermissible “post-solution activity.” 
 
 561 Id. at 1355. 
 562 See id. at 1356. 
 563 Id. at 1357. 
 564 Id. 
 565 Id.  
 566 See id. 
 567 Id. at 1358. 
 568 Id. 
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Judge Moore concurred in part and wrote separately, 
distinguishing isolated nucleic acids from genomic DNA on the 
basis of the “flexible test” applied by the Supreme Court in Funk 
Bros. and Chakrabarty, whereby “an invention which ‘serve[s] the 
ends nature originally provided’ is likely unpatentable subject 
matter, but an invention that is an ‘enlargement of the range of . . . 
utility’ as compared to nature may be patentable.”569  Judge Moore 
viewed “short isolated sequences” as having “a variety of 
applications and uses in isolation that are new and distinct as 
compared to the sequence as it occurs in nature.”570  Judge Moore 
believes, “[b]ecause the different chemical structure of the isolated 
DNA, which is a product of the intervention of man, leads to a 
different and beneficial utility . . . isolated DNA fragments are 
patentable subject matter.”571  “Longer strands” represented to 
Judge Moore a “much closer case,”572 which depended upon “how 
much weight is allocated to the different structure as compared to 
the similarity of the function to nature” of those longer 
sequences.573  The judge viewed cDNA molecules as having 
“markedly different characteristics” than genomic DNA and 
naturally occurring RNA, by virtue of lack of introns and 
substitution of thiamine for uracil and deoxyribose for ribose, 
respectively.574  As a result, “cDNA sequences thus have a 
 
 569 Id. at 1359–60 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)). 
 570 See id. at 1365. 
 571 Id.   
 572 Id. at 1366. 
 573 See id. 
 574 Id. at 1364.  As stated by Judge Moore: 
The cDNA claims present the easiest analysis.  Although the 
plaintiffs (now plaintiff) in the suit argue, and the district court held, 
that cDNA falls within the “laws of nature” exception to section 101 
patentability, I cannot reconcile this argument with the fact that the 
claimed cDNA sequences do not exist in nature.  Moreover, since 
cDNA has all of the introns removed, and only contains the coding 
nucleotides, it can be used to express a protein in a cell which does 
not normally produce it.  Of course, the claimed isolated cDNA is 
inspired by nature—after all, naturally occurring RNA is the template 
upon which cDNA is constructed.  Because it is used as a template, 
however, cDNA has a complementary sequence of nucleotides, and 
therefore has a completely different nucleotide sequence than the 
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distinctive name, character, and use, with markedly different 
chemical characteristics from either the naturally occurring RNA 
or any continuous DNA sequence found on the chromosome.”575 
Judge Bryson, in a separate opinion, agreed that claims to 
BRCA cDNA are patent eligible, but he dissented from the portion 
of the majority’s opinion that isolated segments of DNA are 
statutory subject matter.  Like the “magic microscope” analogy, 
Judge Bryson found that there was “no magic to a chemical bond 
that requires us to recognize a new product when a chemical bond 
is created or broken, but not when other atomic or molecular forces 
are altered,” such as when ionic bonds are broken to derive lithium 
from its salt.576  As stated by Judge Bryson: 
The majority characterizes the question in this case 
as turning on the breaking of covalent bonds linking 
the BRCA genes to the rest of the DNA in 
chromosomes 13 and 17, but its analysis appears to 
place patentable weight on the breaking of other 
chemical bonds, such as the hydrogen bonds that 
are broken when separating DNA from histones 
or—in an example unrelated to this case, the ionic 
bonds that are broken when lithium is derived from 
a salt.  It is difficult to see why differences between 
types of chemical bonds should matter for 
patentability purposes, and I see little support for 
such a distinction in the governing precedents.577 
Even so, Judge Bryson relied on utility to assess the statutory 
eligibility of both cDNA and isolated nucleic acids, finding that 
“cDNA has a utility not present in naturally occurring BRCA DNA 
and mRNA because cDNA can be attached to a promoter and 
inserted into a non-human cell to drive protein expression,”578 
 
RNA.  Moreover, DNA has a different chemical structure than RNA, 
including a different base (T instead of U, respectively) and sugar 
units (deoxyribose instead of ribose, respectively). 
Id.  
 575 Id. 
 576 Id. at 1375 (Bryson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
 577 Id. at 1375 n.3.  
 578 Id. at 1379. 
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rendering it patent eligible, whereas “Myriad has failed to credibly 
identify new uses for the isolated BRCA genes as probes or 
primers.”579  Judge Bryson framed Chakrabarty as focusing “on 
two things: (1) the similarity in structure between what is claimed 
and what is found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between 
what is claimed and what is found in nature.”580  For Judge Bryson, 
the test of “similarity in structure” could be analogized to 
“extracting a slab of marble from the earth [that] does not give rise 
to protectable intellectual property rights, but ‘extracting’ a piece 
of sculpture from that slab or marble [that] does.”581  Judge Bryson 
explicitly linked the test for similarity in structure to that of utility: 
One could say, for example, that a baseball bat is 
“extracted” or “isolated” from an ash tree, but in 
that case the process of “extracting” the baseball bat 
necessarily changes the nature, form, and use of the 
ash tree and thus results in a manmade manufacture, 
not a naturally occurring product.  In that setting, a 
man has defined the parts that are to be retained and 
the parts that are to be discarded.  The result of the 
process of selection is a product with a function that 
is entirely different from that of the raw material 
from which it was obtained.582 
Judge Bryson also linked statutory eligibility to claim breadth, 
stating that “Myriad could easily have claimed more narrowly to 
achieve the utility it attaches to segments of cDNA. . . . [It] could 
have claimed the tagged segments to achieve probe 
functionality.”583  However, the judge did not articulate how so 
modifying the claims would have escaped the charge of “mere 
post-solution activity.”  Further, Judge Bryson’s objection to the 
claims appears to be based, at least in part, on policy, in that 
“[b]road claims to genetic material present a significant obstacle to 
 
 579 Id. at 1378.  
 580 Id.  
 581 Id. at 1377 n.4.  
 582 Id. at 1377.  
 583 Id. at 1379.  
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the next generation of innovation in genetic medicine—multiplex 
tests and whole-genome sequencing.”584 
The court could have reconciled the majority opinion with both 
Moore’s and Bryson’s separate opinions by acknowledging that all 
of the sequences claimed by Myriad—being “isolated” and, 
therefore, not naturally occurring—were new physical applications 
of naturally occurring principles.  Judges Lourie, Moore and 
Bryson might have disagreed with respect to whether the subject 
matter of individual claims was ultimately patentable, but all could 
have agreed—and did, in essence, agree—that the subject matter of 
Myriad’s nucleic acid claims, whether of cDNA, or “shorter” or 
“longer” sequences, as well as the methods that employed them, 
were novel and represented a physical application of naturally-
occurring principle which, therefore, constituted at least one of a 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of the matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof.”  Any question of 
whether the claimed nucleic acid sequences or the methods that 
employed them were judicially-recognized exceptions to statutory 
subject matter as being, for example, naturally-occurring 
phenomena, could easily have been resolved by simply 
recognizing that the claimed sequences did not occur in nature.  
The question of utility could have been addressed separately, and 
could even have been further parsed into a separate question of 
nonobviousness. 
In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,585 the 
Federal Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court in view of 
Bilski upheld the claims of two patents directed to screening a 
plurality of immunization schedules and then immunizing subjects 
in accordance with the immunization schedule “identified as 
[being] a lower risk” than the others,586 while striking down as 
patent-ineligible the claims of a third patent which included 
immunizing a group according to a schedule and then comparing 
the results of that immunization with those of a control group.587  
Writing for the court, Judge Newman stated that while the “claims 
 
 584 See id. at 1379–80. 
 585 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 586 See id. at 1059–60. 
 587 See id. at 1067–68. 
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of the ’139 and ’739 Patents are directed to a method of lowering 
the risk of chronic immune mediated disorder, including the 
physical step of immunization on the determined schedule,”588 the 
claims of the ’283 Patent simply “states the idea of collecting and 
comparing known information.”589  The court stated: “The 
distinction between a concrete, physical step of a process claim, as 
compared with data gathering or insignificant extra-solution 
activity, warrants specific consideration in the context of evolving 
technologies, for ‘Congress took [a] permissive approach to patent 
eligibility to ensure that “ingenuity would receive a liberal 
encouragement.”’”590 
In essence, however, the majority, by characterizing one set of 
claims as including a “concrete, physical step of a process 
claim,”591 and steps of the other set of claims as “data gathering or 
insignificant extra-solution activity,”592 denied any significance 
relevant to patent-eligibility of the immunization step of the ’283 
Patent, leaving only the “comparing” step.  The court, therefore, 
imposed a novelty analysis on both sets of claims in that the 
claimed method of the ’283 Patent would be known, but for the 
“comparing” step, while the claimed subject matter of the ’139 and 
’739 Patents would be novel by having tailored the scope of 
immunization in view of the “comparing” step that preceded it.  
The court, in fact, reduced the claimed method of the ’283 Patent 
to that “of reading the literature,”593 and distinguished its holding 
in Prometheus II by asserting that, whereas “the claims in 
Prometheus are for a method of controlling individualized dosages 
of a specific drug by measuring its metabolic products in the blood 
of individual patients . . . the Classen patents operate on published 
information to determine general immunization schedules.”594  
Specifically, the court partitioned the two sets of claims in Classen 
 
 588 Id. at 1066. 
 589 Id. at 1067. 
 590 Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
76 (H. A. Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854)))). 
 591 Id.  
 592 Id. 
 593 Id. at 1068 n.2. 
 594 Id.  
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on the basis of whether the claims included “transformative steps,” 
reasoning that “[t]he principles applied in Prometheus support the 
patent eligibility of the Classen claims that include such 
transformative steps, but are not relevant to claims that require no 
more than referring to known information but do not include 
immunization in light of that information.”595  The court neglected 
to mention that not all of the claims of Prometheus included any 
“administration” step.596 
Judge Moore dissented from the Classen majority opinion in 
that she saw “no distinction between the ’283 claims and the ’139 
and ’739 claims,”597 noting that “[t]he ’283 patent claim clearly 
and unequivocally requires the physical act of immunization and it 
is unfair of the majority to analyze the claim for § 101 purposes as 
though it did not have that step.”598  Although recognizing that 
both sets of claims include a positive “immunizing” step, Judge 
Moore stated that both sets of claims were of “staggering 
breadth”599 that presented inherent “preemption issues”600 because 
the “claims cover any kind of comparison between any two 
schedules, using any drugs in comparing the incidence of any 
chronic immune disease.”601  Therefore, in the name of “striking 
the balance between protecting inventors and not granting 
monopolies over procedures that others would discover by 
independent, creative application of general principles,”602  Judge 
Moore considered the immunization step of the ’283 Patent to be 
“nothing more than a data gathering step necessary to explore the 
effects of different immunization schedules,”603 and that of the 
’739 Patent to be mere “post-solution activity.”604  Invoking Flook, 
 
 595 Id. 
 596 See supra notes 427–32 and accompanying text. 
 597 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1076 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 598 Id. at 1077 n.1. 
 599 Id. at 1076. 
 600 Id.  
 601 Id. at 1078. 
 602 Id. at 1080 (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 
(2010)). 
 603 Id. at 1079 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 604 Id. (Moore, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Moore determined that neither sets of claims were the “kind 
of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”605 
Despite being a dissenting opinion, Judge Moore’s reasoning 
closely paralleled Judge Newman’s majority opinion.  Specifically, 
both judges discounted the significance of positively claiming 
“immunizing” as a distinct step of the claimed methods by 
relegating that step to “data gathering” or “post-solution 
activity.”606  Also, both Judge Newman and Judge Moore inserted 
other statutory requirements as part of their analysis.  As discussed 
above, Judge Newman, in effect, distinguished the two sets of 
claims on the basis of novelty, where comparison of known 
immunization schedules lacked novelty, while immunization in 
view of such comparison possessed novelty.  Judge Moore, on the 
other hand, based her analysis on overbreadth, which typically is 
part of an enablement analysis under the first paragraph of 35 
U.S.C. § 112.  Both analyses, however, as in previous cases, 
discussed above, could have been made considerably easier by 
recognizing that any claim that positively asserts a physical 
method step—in this case that of “immunizing”—constitutes a 
process under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, therefore, constitutes patent 
eligible subject matter.  There is no need to go any further with 
respect to patent eligibility. 
Once the determination has been made that both sets of claims 
represent a physical application of naturally-occurring principle, 
subsequent analysis of novelty and enablement would have led 
Judges Newman and Moore to their respective conclusions, and 
may even have compelled them to come to the same conclusion—
namely, that the claims of the ’283 Patent were not novel because 
the method of conducting the immunizing step prior to any 
comparison was known, and that subsequent comparison did not 
yield any benefit absent immunizing a population on the basis of 
that comparison, as specified in the claims of the ’139 and ’739 
Patents.  Similarly, Judges Newman and Moore, by acknowledging 
that the claims of the ’139 and ’739 Patents constituted patent 
eligible subject matter, may have disagreed with respect to whether 
 
 605 See id. at 1080 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
 606 See id. at 1079–80; see also supra note 585–95 and accompanying text. 
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the subject matter of the claims was impermissibly broad, but they 
would do so on the basis of accepted principles of enablement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 rather than try to apply those principles to 
an analysis of patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
In another case that tested the limits of patent eligibility, 
Ultramerical v. Hulu,607 the Federal Circuit reversed a lower 
court’s dismissal of claims as being impermissibly abstract.608  The 
claims were directed to a method for distributing copyrighted 
products over the Internet by providing copyrighted material to 
consumers in exchange for viewing advertisements.609  The 
Federal Circuit reaffirmed determinations of subject matter 
eligibility as a “threshold check,”610 prerequisite to assessment 
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112, and recognized that, while it 
is understood that “laws of nature and physical phenomena cannot 
be invented,” the issue of “[a]bstractness . . . has presented a 
different set of interpretive problems, particularly for the section 
101 ‘process’ category.”611  The court characterized the claimed 
invention as a “method for monetizing and distributing copyrighted 
products over the Internet”612 that extended beyond the “mere idea 
that advertising can be used as a form of currency.”613  Rather, the 
court held that the claimed subject matter constituted a “practical 
application of this idea”614 that consisted of several steps, many of 
which would likely “require intricate and complex computer 
programming.”615  The degree of “programming complexity 
required before a computer-implemented method can be patent 
eligible”616 was not defined, nor would the court hold that “use of 
 
 607 Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 608 See id. at 1330. 
 609 Id. at 1324. 
 610 Id. at 1326 (“More importantly, as § 101 itself expresses, subject matter eligibility is 
merely a threshold check; claim patentability ultimately depends on the ‘conditions and 
requirement of this title.’”). 
 611 Id. 
 612 See id. at 1327. 
 613 See id. at 1328. 
 614 Id. 
 615 Id. 
 616 Id. 
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an Internet website to practice such a method is either necessary or 
sufficient in every case to satisfy section 101.”617 
Rather, the Ultramercial court held that they “simply find the 
claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of these 
factors.”618  In contrast to CyberSource, where the court held that 
CyberSource had not “met its burden to demonstrate that [the 
claim] is ‘truly drawn to a specific’ computer readable medium,”619 
the court in Ultramercial held that the claims were directed to a 
“particular method for collecting revenue from the distribution of 
media products over the Internet.”620  Specifically, the court stated 
that, “[u]nlike the claims in CyberSource, the claims here require, 
among other things, controlled interaction with a consumer via an 
Internet website, something far removed from purely mental 
steps.”621  As a consequence, quoting Research Corp., the court 
held that Ultramercial’s claimed invention was “not ‘so manifestly 
abstract as to override the statutory extra interest in section 
101.’”622 
Again, selectively characterizing a claimed invention and 
placing it on a scale of “abstractness”—as was done by the court in 
Ultramercial—limits the precedential value of any jurisprudence 
assessing patent eligibility.  If the criteria for satisfaction of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 is reliance on whether any claimed invention is “so 
manifestly abstract”623 as to “override the statutory language and 
framework of the patent act,”624 then it should be expected that 
litigation in this area of the law will increase along with calls for a 
bright line test. 
Physical application of naturally-occurring principle as a test 
for patent eligibility has been before us all along, and failure to 
 
 617 Id. 
 618 Id. 
 619 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  
 620 Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1329. 
 621 Id. at 1330. 
 622 Id. (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 
2010)). 
 623 Id. 
 624 Id. at 1328 (quoting Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869). 
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recognize and strictly apply it is causing confusion that ultimately 
will lead to erosion of patent protection as a driving force in 
economic development.  In Ultramercial, the exchange of 
copyrighted material for advertisement employing computer 
software as “currency” clearly lacks physical application of any 
naturally-occurring principal.  The claimed method is, instead, 
purely a function of social leverage, such as the claimed method of 
hedging that was repudiated by the Supreme Court in Bilski.625  No 
amount of “intricate and complex computer programming,” or 
“practical application of this idea,”626 can change the fact that the 
claimed subject matter in Ultramercial required no physical steps 
and involved no application of naturally-occurring principal. 
Even if, as a hypothetical, the claimed subject matter of 
Ultramercial did specify some physical application of naturally-
occurring principal, such as making keystrokes, the claimed 
subject matter would meet the statutory requirement of a process 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  That same subject matter may or may not 
meet the other requirements of the Patent Act of 1952, but would 
have to do so within the realm of criteria set forth with respect to 
those keystrokes, and not with respect to motivation for making 
those keystrokes that are outside the scope of patent eligibility.  
Although such easy assessments may be subject to the criticism 
that statutory eligibility might simply be a matter of claim-drafting 
skill, an increased focus on physical application of naturally-
occurring principal would easily separate patent eligible subject 
matter from that which is not, and would allow assessment of 
patentability under other sections of the statute. 
For example, in the case of Ultramercial, although application 
of keystrokes as method steps would cause the claim to meet the 
requirements of section 101, the claimed method would not meet 
the requirements of section 102 unless the sequence of keystrokes 
was novel and, even if the sequence of keystrokes was novel, it 
would be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the only basis for 
nonobviousness of that sequence would be predicated on the patent 
ineligible subject matter of exchange of copyrighted material for 
 
 625 See supra text accompanying notes 451–90. 
 626 Id. 
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advertisement.  The historical alternative is to consider any such 
steps included in the claim to be considered mere post-solution 
activity, which would be disqualified from consideration of the 
claimed invention as a whole under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
However, partitioning the analysis as proposed clearly 
distinguishes the tests for patent eligibility from patentability.  
Regardless of which approach is applied, a decision must be made 
as to the scope of patent eligible subject matter.  As can be seen, 
decisions made in the absence of consideration as to whether the 
principle of an invention is an application of a naturally-occurring 
principle or one of human social origin—such as finance, 
government or religion—and in the absence of considerations as to 
whether that claimed invention is a physical application of that 
principle, leads to an inextricable difficulties in the predictability 
of the outcome of any question regarding eligibility for patent 
protection. 
III. MAYO V. PROMETHEUS: BEYOND THE ZERO 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.,627 Justice Breyer for the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
made by the Federal Circuit on remand.  In a 9-0 decision, the 
Court recognized that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas” are not patentable,628 but that “to transform an 
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of 
such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature 
while adding the words ‘apply it.’”629  Rather, relying on Flook, 
the Court stated that its precedents “insist that a process that 
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements 
or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent and practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law 
itself.”630  As discussed above, the Court in Flook  relied upon lack 
of “inventive application of principle” to deny patent eligibility to 
 
 627 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 628 See id. at 1292 
 629 See id. at 1294. 
 630 Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
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Flook’s method for calculating an alarm limit.631  Specifically, as 
stated by the Court in Flook: 
Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, 
not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as 
one component, but because once that algorithm is 
assumed to be within the prior art, that the 
application, considered as a whole, contains no 
patentable invention.  Even though a phenomenon 
of nature or mathematical formula may be well-
known, an inventive application of the principle 
may be patented.  Conversely, the discovery of such 
a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there 
is some other inventive concept in its application.632 
According to the Court in Mayo, the question of patent 
eligibility did not hinge upon the “machine-or-transformation test,” 
despite the fact that it is an “important and useful clue,” that the 
Federal Circuit believed “led to the ‘clear and compelling 
conclusion . . . that the . . . claims . . . do not encompass laws of 
nature or preempt natural correlations.”633  Instead, the Court held 
that the question was whether “the patent claims add enough to 
their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they 
describe to qualify as patent eligible processes that apply natural 
laws.”634 
The Court then addressed the “administering” step, 
“determining” step and “wherein” step of Prometheus’ claims and 
found that each of them, individually, was a  conventional method 
step which, even in combination, “adds nothing to the laws of 
nature that is not already present when the steps are considered 
separately.”635  Rather, according to the Court, “the three steps 
simply tell doctors to gather data from which they may draw an 
inference in light of the correlations.”636  The Court compared 
 
 631 See supra text accompanying note 297–308. 
 632 Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. 
 633 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (quoting Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010)). 
 634 Id. at 1297. 
 635 Id. at 1298. 
 636 Id. 
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Prometheus’ method with those in Diehr and Flook, stating that 
those cases were the “most directly on point,”637 albeit having 
opposite conclusions.  In particular, the Court held that, whereas in 
Diehr the “steps of the process integrated the equation into the 
process as a whole”638 and thereby “transformed the process into 
an inventive application of the formula,”639 the process in Flook 
“did not ‘explain how the variables used in the formula were to be 
selected, nor did the [claim] contain any disclosure relating to 
chemical processes at work or the means of setting off an alarm or 
adjusting the alarm limit,’”640 and, therefore, “the other steps in the 
process did not limit the claim to a particular application.”641  As a 
result, “there was no ‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application 
of the formula.”642  The Court held that the “claim before us 
presents a case for patentability that is weaker than the (patent 
eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable) 
claim in Flook”643 because the “instructions” of the claim “add 
nothing specific to the laws of nature other than what is well-
understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in 
by those in the field.”644 
The Mayo Court also offered other, older cases to support its 
conclusions.  For example, Neilson v. Harford, an eighteenth-
century English case645 which was directed to introduction of 
heated air to a furnace,646 was considered by the Mayo Court to 
have been held patentable because the claimed process “included 
not only a law of nature but also several unconventional steps 
(such as inserting the receptacle, applying heat to the receptacle 
externally, and blowing the air to into the furnace)”647 and, thus, 
 
 637 Id. 
 638 Id. 
 639 Id. at 1299. 
 640 Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 (1981)). 
 641 Id. 
 642 Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
 643 Id. 
 644 Id. 
 645 See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text. 
 646 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300 (quoting Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rpt. 
1266 (Exch. Div.); 8 M. & W. 806). 
 647 Id. 
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“explained how the principal could be implemented in an inventive 
way.”648 
By way of contrast, the Court recalled how the patent 
application in Bilski claimed “an unpatentable abstract idea,”649 
namely the “concept of hedging”650 that, like Flook, could not be 
saved by limiting that idea to “one field of use or adding token 
postsolution components.”651  The Court also linked “post solution 
activity” to preemption through Benson by stating that, because the 
mathematical formula in Benson “‘had no substantial practical 
application except in connection with the digital computer’ . . . the 
claim (like the claims before us [in Prometheus]) was overly 
broad; it did not differ significantly from a claim that just said 
‘apply the algorithm.’”652  The underlying problem for the Court 
was the same as that stated in Morse: what if a future inventor 
were to “discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance . . . 
[that] if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, 
nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this 
patentee[?]”653  According to the Mayo Court, these concerns were 
also reflected in the decisions to deny patent eligibility under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 in Benson, Bilski and Flook.  As summarized by the 
Court: 
[E]ven though rewarding with patents those who 
discover new laws of nature and the like might well 
encourage their discovery, those laws and 
principles, considered generally, are “the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work.”  And so there 
is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their 
use will inhibit future innovation premised upon 
them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented 
process amounts to no more than an instruction to 
“apply the natural law,” or otherwise forecloses 
 
 648 Id. 
 649 Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010)). 
 650 Id. (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222). 
 651 Id. at 1301 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231). 
 652 Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). 
 653 Id. (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)). 
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more future invention than the underlying discovery 
could reasonably justify.654 
As applied to Prometheus’ claimed subject matter, the Court 
stated that “[w]e need not, and do not, now decide whether were 
the steps at issue here less conventional, these features of the claim 
would prove sufficient to invalidate them.”655 
The Court recognized that, “in evaluating the significance of 
additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 
102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap,” however,  
§§ 102 and 103 say nothing about treating laws of 
nature as if they were part of the prior art when 
applying those sections False[and] studiously 
ignoring all laws of nature when evaluating patents 
under §§ 102 and 103 would ‘make all inventions 
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced 
to underlying principles of nature which, once 
known, make their implementation obvious.”656 
These considerations led the Court “to decline the Government’s 
invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better 
established inquiry under section 101.”657  In essence, the Court 
was attempting to “balance”658 the effects of patent protection, 
which it considered to be “a two-edged sword,”659 whereby “[o]n 
the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary 
incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.  On the 
other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the flow of 
information that might permit, indeed spur, invention . . . .”660 
The Supreme Court’s insistence on including an “inventive 
concept” or “inventive application” of a law of nature as a criterion 
for assessing patent eligibility stems from dual concerns that 
“[i]ntuitively, one would suppose that a newly discovered law of 
 
 654 Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (1972)). 
 655 Id. at 1302. 
 656 Id. at 1304 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981)). 
 657 Id.  
 658 Id. at 1305. 
 659 Id. 
 660 Id. 
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nature is novel,”661 and that, because “§§ 102 and 103 say nothing 
about treating laws of nature as if they were part of the prior art 
when applying those subsections,”662 the consequence of failing to 
require an “inventive concept” as part of the threshold for patent 
eligibility of § 101 “would make the ‘law of nature’ exception to § 
101 patentability a dead letter.”663  Therefore, according to the 
Court, “to shift the patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to these later 
sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while 
assuming that those sections can do work they are not equipped to 
do.”664 
However, mandating that a claimed combination of elements 
embody an “inventive concept,” threatens to collapse the 
requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 
112 into that of patent eligibility by failing to provide any basis for 
distinguishing between them.  Alternatively, the failure to 
acknowledge that the criteria for novelty, nonobviousness and 
enablement are inherent in assessments of “inventive conception” 
hopelessly mires patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in a 
sliding scale of policy considerations and arbitrary judgments.  The 
Supreme Court in Mayo expressly articulated the relative nature of 
patent eligibility: 
But the underlying functional concern here is a 
relative one: how much future innovation is 
foreclosed relative to the contribution of the 
inventor.  A patent upon a narrow law of nature 
may not inhibit future research as seriously as 
would a patent upon Einstein’s law of relativity, but 
the creative value of the discovery is also 
considerably smaller.  And, as we have previously 
pointed out, even a narrow law of nature (such as 
the one before us) can inhibit future research.665 
In view of such language by the Supreme Court, it is 
understandable that practitioners and theoreticians would advocate 
 
 661 Id. at 1304. 
 662 Id. 
 663 Id. at 1303. 
 664 Id. at 1304. 
 665 Id. at 1303 (emphasis added). 
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that 35 U.S.C. § 101 not be addressed as a “threshold” 
consideration preliminary to standards under §§ 102, 103 and 112, 
but, rather, to address 35 U.S.C. § 101 as necessary only after 
addressing those other considerations.666 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus marks 
the demise of any boundary to what may be considered statutory 
subject matter, so long as the claimed subject matter can be 
“characterized,” to use the Supreme Court’s term,667 in a manner 
that appears not to embrace a scope so large as to “inhibit future 
research.”668  One consequence of applying only a vague standard 
of “inventive conception” and “inventive application” to patent 
eligibility, as the Court in Mayo has done, is to free patentable 
subject matter from physical application of laws of nature, physical 
phenomena and abstract ideas.  This is contrary to historical 
notions of patent eligibility.  Ironically, failure to limit patent 
eligibility to physical applications of naturally-occurring 
phenomena and abstract principles obscures the “bright-line 
prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathematical 
formulas and the like” noted by the Court,669 and inevitability will 
result in the descent of our patent regime. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the patent system in the United States has evolved 
considerably since the Patent Act of 1790, and although it has 
always been distinct from the English patent custom from which it 
was derived, there are certain fundamental principles that remain 
manifest, albeit sometimes rather cryptically, in our current 
jurisprudence.  One of these is the criterion of subject matter 
eligibility for patent protection.  The term “useful art” in Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, under the meaning of that 
 
 666 See, e.g., supra note 17. 
 667 132 S. Ct. at 1299.  In distinguishing Flook from Diehr, the Court stated: “The 
Court, as in Diehr, pointed out that the basic mathematical equation, like a law of nature, 
was not patentable.  But it characterized the claimed process as doing nothing other than 
‘provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for computing an updated alarm limit.’” Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978)).   
 668 Id. at 1303. 
 669 Id. 
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term at the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, has been 
understood to be limited to physical applications of naturally-
occurring principle.  Exceptions to statutory classes of patent 
eligible subject matter had their basis in lack of novelty, and barred 
patent protection for subject matter that would preempt, without 
limit, exclusive rights to laws of nature, physical phenomena and 
abstract ideas. 
Advancements in technology have clearly eclipsed the 
imaginations of the Founders as undoubtedly they presumed it 
would.  However, the space they created within the Constitution 
“by securing for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right 
to their . . . discoveries,”670 as applied by the various patent acts 
dating from 1790, and as interpreted by the courts, has until 
recently exhibited remarkable consistency in mandating an 
underlying physical manifestation of naturally-occurring principle.  
Many tests have evolved over the last two hundred years to attempt 
to adapt this broad concept to new technologies for which patent 
protection is sought.  However, if these tests obscure a 
fundamental requirement of some sort of physical application of 
naturally-occurring principle by employing some undefined 
terminology or open policy, such as “inventive concept,” 
“inventive application,” or by requiring elements that are “less than 
conventional,” as in Mayo v. Prometheus, the resulting 
unpredictability will undermine the patent system as we know it 
and may, ultimately, lead to diminished reliance on patents as a 
means for advancement of our societal economic development. 
 
 
 670 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
